Friday, May 14, 2004

GOOD BOYS (ALMOST) GONE BAD

William Fisher

The year was 1951. The Korean War was raging. I was drafted into the Army and sent for basic training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. After basic, I was assigned to a military police company based at the then First Army headquarters on Governors Island in New York harbor.

Since I had a college degree and had worked for a couple of years in journalism, it was, of course, logical that they should make me a cop. My MP company had three missions. It directed traffic on and off the ferries that connected our Island with New York City. It sent teams of MPs to patrol dangerous combat zones like Times Square looking for soldiers who were AWOL, drunk, or otherwise mischievous. And it patrolled the Island itself looking for similar types of miscreants.

They gave me several weeks of MP training. This consisted mostly of lectures on the Code of Military Justice and demonstrations and exercises in making arrests and subduing over-athletic detainees, learning proper dress and radio code numbers like civilian cops have, and completing the paperwork required for each detainee. I can’t recall any mention of the Geneva Conventions, perhaps because they had been ratified only a year or two earlier. Then they gave me my MP armband and an enormous .45 caliber sidearm. I looked like George Patton!

My company commander was the Superintendent of Schools in a smallish city upstate New York. But my chain of command, as I understood it, went from me to my desk sergeant – the man who ran our police station. Sgt. Duffy, we’ll call him, was regular army. He was a caricature of a Georgia redneck. Like many of the regular army people I met, he was rabidly anti-black (called Negro back then), rabidly anti-Semitic, rabidly anti-Northerner, rabidly anti-university, and a big off-duty drinker.

But the scariest thing about Sgt. Duffy was his barely concealed rage. Sgt. Duffy was just plain sadistic. “You find a GI messing up -- I don’t care what he’s done -- and you treat him rough, and he won’t be back. And no exceptions!” Sgt. Duffy admonished his young MPs. Repeated often enough, Sgt. Duffy created an environment of revenge, retribution, and, most importantly, power and domination. We were the bosses. We were empowered!

That bizarre message resonated among the frustrated young MPs in our squad – all draftees, all angry at the Army for drafting us, all angry at the regular army drill sergeants who had made basic training a living hell, all angry at the thought that any day we could get orders to ship out to Korea to become combat MPs, the most dangerous job in the Army.

Mercifully, that anger rarely surfaced among the young MPs – there weren’t that many ‘bad guys’ to for us to arrest. But one night I was on car patrol around the Island when I spotted a car parked where it shouldn’t have been. I took my flashlight and approached the car. In the back seat, a GI and a WAC (that was the Women’s Army Corps) were doing what girls and boys usually do in back seats of cars.

I knocked on the window and called out “you need to move this car, right now!” No response. I used my flashlight to knock on the window again. The window now opened and the GI inside yelled out “I have permission to park here”, and closed the window again. I now banged on the window more aggressively. A door opened and a Staff Sergeant got out. “Piss off, Private!” he shouted. I could smell the booze as he approached me. “Piss off”, he shouted in my face.

I felt myself getting angry at having my power questioned. “Look”, I said, trying to calm this very drunk soldier. “Let’s not get you into trouble. You could lose a stripe. Why don’t you just move your car to a parking space, and we’ll both be on our way?”

Next thing I knew an arm was coming toward me. I ducked and did what I had learned in basic training. I grabbed his hand with both of mine and twisted it downward, forcing his body to go in the same direction. Then I forced the arm I was holding behind his back, and clicked on one handcuff. I pushed him toward the railing where the car was parked, and used it to attach the other cuff. I told the WAC to stay in the car. Then I called Sgt. Duffy for backup. Just like NYPD Blue!

It was 20-or-so minutes before my backup arrived, and all the while my ‘prisoner’ was shouting unprintable threats and insults, and I was getting angrier by the second. It would have been so easy to, as the TV cops say, ‘tune him up’, and I was seriously tempted. After all, this was all about control and domination!

Thankfully, I managed to restrain myself, and I’m glad I did. That’s what I was trained to do. But I have to wonder: How would I have behaved in Abu Ghraib prison?



















edback to: wfisher206@aol.com

LABOR PAINS

By William Fisher

May Day has come and gone in Egypt, and only one thing was missing: Labor.

As reported in Al Ahram, Egypt’s leading daily newspaper, “On May 1st police forces overwhelmed a group of activists holding a May Day demonstration in Tahrir Square (in downtown Cairo) calling for a 40 per cent increase in wages.”

There are three problems with a 40 per cent wage increase – or any. The first is that Egypt’s 21 million workers are understandably seeking a larger slice of a pie that has been getting smaller year-by-year. The second is that labor in Egypt has no political power. The third is that if it had any power, the police would squash it like a roach.

Egypt’s economy is in freefall. Unemployment and under-employment has been rising and working conditions getting worse. Most Egyptian workers live well below the poverty line.

The public sector – the government and the industries it owns – remains the country’s largest employer, despite years of efforts to privatize. Governments produce nothing and the enterprises they run are customarily poorly managed, over-staffed and inefficient.

Meanwhile, prices have been rising steadily. The price of basic staples has gone up between 33 and 109 per cent -- onions have increased by 500 per cent. Over five million people live in shantytowns, and over 100,000 Egyptians are diagnosed with cancer every year as a result of pollutants." According to Manpower and Training Minister Ahmed El-Amawi, improved investment is the key to solving many of the problems. And yet, according to a report by the Chambers of Commerce Federation, 800 factories in the new industrial satellite cities have stopped production as a result of economic recession. Investment in Egypt has dwindled to a trickle.

Organized labor is an oxymoron. It has no political constituency. The channels through which workers can express their demands are extremely limited. Labor activists have long pressed for an open trade union system to allow for multiplicity. The General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) is seen to be a government puppet in its endorsement of the unified labor law passed last year. Labor activists like Kamal Abbas, head of the Centre for Trade Union Workers' Services (CTUWS), believe part of the problem stems from the committee established under the law to decide on minimum wage, the restrictions of strike action, and limited time contracts. The committee, which is under the leadership of the Minister of Planning, has yet to take any action.

The legal system still provides an avenue for workers, but the current law impedes worker access to the courts. Petitions now go to the Appeals Court as opposed to courts of first instance, and there are only eight Appeals Courts in the country. Last year alone, more than 1,000 cases were backlogged. Moreover, the five-member committee established under the new law to look into labor complaints does not convene regularly. The group includes representatives of the Federation, the judiciary and the business community, but business people rarely attend, so the committee does not convene.

The Nasserist Party, which rails against privatization, American neo-colonialism and unemployment, has announced the formation of a Labor Front coalition of labor offices at political parties and labor activists. It has initiated a campaign to make sure workers understand their rights under the new law and can press for those rights. But most observers believe the political parties can do little since they are subject to heavy-handed government restrictions. Thus, there is
no organized labor constituency.

For many years, the United States, the European Union, and other donors have poured tens of millions of dollars into helping Egypt build a more competitive private sector and a more business-friendly policy environment for them to operate in. Significant funding has also been devoted to upgrading human capital: training programs to give the workforce the skills needed to survive in a 21st century environment. Yet university grads drive taxis or emigrate to the US and Europe. In 2001, 80 per cent of university graduates were unemployed a year after their graduation.

While there has been some progress in private sector development, government policy, capital, regulatory and practice constraints continue to place virtually insurmountable obstacles in the path of growth, except for the already wealthy. This chokes off investment and leads to still higher unemployment. Moreover, It is the wealthy who are able to use their contacts to practice ‘crony capitalism’, who tend to get most of the benefits of donor funds, who use their money to lubricate permitting and customs procedures, and who have access to the banking system.

In that environment, the prospects for substantial advances for workers are less than minimal. And so are the prospects for Egypt’s rise out of poverty and under-development.












dback to: wfisher206@aol.com

Saturday, May 08, 2004

A TALE OF TWO CITIES



By William Fisher

This is a story about Fallujah and the Americans, but it begins in Egypt.

In the first few months of my three-year stay in Cairo, telephone service was a constant and frustrating nightmare. When you picked up the phone to make a call, back would come a recorded (in Arabic, of course) message, “you are not authorized to make this call.” When (and if) the phone rang, it would disconnect immediately.

I finally decided to take time off from my work to present myself at the ‘Central’ – the phone company office – to let them know in no uncertain terms that I was their paying customer and that I expected the service I was paying for.

When I asked Said, my driver, to take me to the phone company, he enquired about the problem. I told him. His response: “Let me handle it.” My suspicion was he would handle it ‘the Egyptian way,’ promises would be made, but in the end nothing would get done. But I played along.

We arrived at the Central and Said asked to see the head man. He mentioned that he had with him ‘an American manager’ interested in technology. In minutes, we were escorted through an enormous hall lined with telephone switching equipment, and into the boss’ office. The office was a huge room littered with old cups of coffee, ashtrays piled high with ancient cigarette butts, files covering the floor, and an IBM computer and a stack of huge Dickensian ledger books hiding the surface of the boss’s desk.

From behind the ledgers emerged a large man with a beer belly. Said addressed him. With my half-dozen Arabic words, I understood him to be introducing both of us. This was followed by much smiling and shaking of hands. Said must have introduced me as Donald Trump or Bill Gates, because the boss and his underlings all seemed embarrassingly deferential. The boss’ name was Hesham.

Said and Hesham started talking. Coffee arrived. I heard Said mention the name of the village where he was born. (I learned later that Hesham was born a quarter-mile up the road from Said, and they had many friends in common.) A broad smile covered Hesham’s face. Little pastries arrived and there was more talking and more coffee. Then Hesham rose and beckoned me to come with him. He led me down the rows of switching equipment, explaining the whole setup in Arabic while Said translated for me into English.

I asked some questions that stretched my technical knowledge to its limits. Hesham answered them all. Back in his office, more coffee. None of this gringo Nescafe; this was real coffee, and I was now totally wired with caffeine. After five or 10 minutes more of seemingly rambling conversation, Said gave me the funny glance he always used when he needed to be in charge.

He rose and I rose with him. I shook Hesham’s hand and thanked him for his time and hospitality. As Said and I headed for the door, Hesham said (I later learned), “what’s your friend’s phone number?” Said wrote it on a slip of paper. Hesham took the paper and went down the rows of switches. He stopped and summoned one of his underlings to climb up one of the very tall ladders to the switch for my phone number. He pulled it out of its socket and handed it to Hesham. Hesham examined it and suddenly looked very embarrassed. He barked a few commands at the technician, who went away and returned in less than three minutes with a box from which he took a shiny new switch, which he put into its housing.

We all shook hands again, and Said and I headed out.

Back at my apartment overlooking the Nile, I discovered I had a twenty-first century telephone, including overseas service with English-speaking operators, and directory enquiry announcements in both Arabic and English.

What does all this tell us about Fallujah and the Americans? If we’re listening, it tells us volumes. It tells us that different people living in different cultures have very different ways of approaching and solving problems. It tells us that being seen to be humiliated is more an affront to some people than to others. It tells us that people have very different senses of time and pride and priorities.

It would be simplistic in the extreme to think that, given American missteps over the past year, any number of cups of coffee at the telephone exchange would now make us welcome in Fallujah. The US finds itself in ‘major combat’ yet again. Not even Nostradamus could predict whether that might have been avoidable. But it now seems clear that the US has managed to squander whatever goodwill it may have had just after President George W. Bush declared the end of ‘major combat.’ It also seems clear that America’s failures can be attributed in large part to the absence of any credible strategy for winning the peace and to its inability to anticipate the kinds of problems it was surprised to find itself facing. And at the tactical level, the US Coalition Provisional Authority and the American military have seemed totally clueless about how to get things done in Iraq, especially in the ‘Sunni triangle.’ It is unclear whether the CPA and the military acted out of built-in biases, or!

lacked the crucial fingertip knowledge of the society, or simply failed to call on or listen to, those who had it.

For the US, Fallujah is already lost, regardless of the military outcome. But if the band of Saddamist generals can miraculously cobble together a force that is successful in returning a semblance of stability to that beleaguered city, we Americans can learn a critically important lesson from our failures. But only if we’re listening.



TOWARD A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By William Fisher

I wish John Kerry would write to the American people as follows:

My fellow countrymen:

When George W. Bush ran for the presidency, he promised to unite America. Almost four years later, we find ourselves divided on just about every major political, social and economic issue. George W. Bush has become the most polarizing divider in our history.

Therefore, I have decided that, when I am elected president, one of my top priorities will be to bring us together. As a first step, I will form a Government of National Unity. We are a nation that cherishes diversity, and my government will be as diverse as our nation itself. Even among those who disagree with me on particular issues, we still have far more in common than the ideas that divide us. Until we can all learn to work together, our country cannot realize its full potential at home, much less try to set an example for the rest of the world.

So I am pleased to announce that the following leaders have agreed to serve in my administration.

As Vice President, Senator John McCain, member of the Armed Services Committee.
As Secretary of State, Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
As Secretary of Defense, John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy under President Reagan and a member of the 9/11 Commission.
As Secretary of Treasury, Lawrence H. Summers, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton Administration and currently president of Harvard.
As secretary of Homeland Security, Richard Clarke, advisor to four presidents and head of counter-terrorism in the Clinton and Bush administrations.
As my National Security Advisor, Richard Holbrook, US Ambassador to the United Nations in the Clinton Administration.
As Attorney General, Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton, non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives from Washington, DC.
As Director of Central Intelligence, Rep. Porter J. Goss, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.

Other similarly diverse cabinet appointments will be announced as I continue to explore this new concept with leaders of all political persuasions and from all walks of American life.

Welding this diverse group into a cohesive and effective team will be challenging. These are strong leaders with strong convictions. But I have known all these people for many years. They are all good listeners and, like me, they are concerned about the future of our country. I am convinced that this new approach is critical if we are to restore American credibility, keep our people safe and at work, and promote peace and security around the world,

Thanks for your support.

Sincerely,

John Kerry

Dream on? Well, maybe. But there have been other times in American history when obvious opponents came together for the sake of national unity. I am reminded of the unlikely alliance between President Truman and Midwest conservative Senator Arthur M. Vandenberg. That brought our country to one of its finest hours – the Marshall Plan. Think about it.








PEOPLE IN GLASS HOUSES

By William Fisher

Of course, Arabs are outraged by the awful photographs of the apparent abuse of Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers in Iraq. We are all outraged. But one has to question whether there is not more than a little hypocrisy in the reactions of most Arab governments and of the Arab League itself.

A spokesman for the League said in Cairo, "It is beyond the words of despicable acts and disgust that we feel at watching such photographs."

What’s wrong with this picture is that many of the Middle East’s Arab states, as well as Israel, have long, bloody, and current histories of torture and death among prisoners while in detention. Egypt is near the top of the list, and the Cairo-based and gravely dysfunctional Arab League is well aware of it.

Egypt’s record was comprehensively documented in a February 2004 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), along with detailed recommendations to the League and to the Government of Egypt for corrective actions. To date, neither party has done anything to remedy the situation.

The findings? HRW documented dozens of cases of torture and death in detention. Torture in Egypt, the Report says, is “epidemic, a widespread and persistent phenomenon affecting large numbers of ordinary citizens who find themselves in police custody as suspects or in connection with criminal investigations. Security forces and the police routinely torture or ill-treat detainees, particularly during interrogation. In most cases, detainees are tortured to obtain information and coerce confessions, sometimes leading to death in custody. “ Deaths in custody as a result of torture and ill treatment have shown a disturbing rise in the past two years, HRW says -- at least ten cases in 2002 and seven in 2003. In the September-November 2003 period alone, Egyptian human rights organizations reported four cases of deaths in custody.

Methods include beatings with fists, feet, and leather straps, sticks, and electric cables; suspension in contorted and painful positions accompanied by beatings; the application of electric shocks; and sexual intimidation and violence.

In the past decade, suspected Islamist militants have borne the brunt of these acts. Recently, however, increasing numbers of secular and leftist dissidents have also been tortured by police and security officials. In March and April 2003, for example, demonstrators and alleged organizers of public protests against the US-led war in Iraq were tortured and ill treated in detention. Police and state security agencies continue to use torture in order to suppress political dissent.

Egyptian authorities fail to investigate the great majority of allegations of torture. In the few cases where officers have been prosecuted for torture or ill treatment, charges were often inappropriately lenient and penalties inadequate. This lack of effective public accountability and transparency has led to “a culture of impunity” and contributed to the institutionalization of torture.”

The Prosecutor General’s office opened criminal investigations in some of the cases of death in detention following formal complaints by human rights lawyers and family members. But, says HRW, “none of these investigations have led to criminal prosecution or disciplinary actions against the perpetrators.” Moreover, Egypt’s Penal Code fails to provide for effective punishment of law enforcement officials responsible for torture and ill treatment. It states that any official who subjects persons to “cruelty,” including physical harm or offences to their dignity, “shall be sentenced to an arrest period of no longer than one year, or with a fine not to exceed L.E. 200 [$30].”

One of the reasons for Egypt’s failure to investigate and punish acts of torture by law enforcement is that it has appointed the fox to guard the henhouse. Says HRW: “There is an apparent conflict of interest in placing the responsibility to monitor places of detention, order forensic exams, and investigate and prosecute abuses by officials within the same office that is responsible for ordering arrests, obtaining confessions, and successfully prosecuting criminal suspects.”

Egypt, a close American ally and one of the largest recipients of US aid, is party to all the international human rights treaties prohibiting torture and mandating investigations, and torture is forbidden by Egypt’s Constitution. Moreover, the country now has an official human rights commission, headed by former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali.

Let us hope the US military will mete out swift and appropriate punishment to the American soldiers who disgraced their country. And let us hope that Egypt and other Arab governments are watching – and learning.

Friday, April 16, 2004

THE FIVE DOTS

Feedback to: wfisher206@aol.com



By William Fisher

Post 9/11, the cliché de jour became the failure of the US intelligence community to “connect the dots.” Now, President’s Bush’s policy shift regarding Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s Gaza withdrawal plan suggests that the US is again unable to connect the dots.

There are five main dots.

Dot One. One might hope that President Bush would have learned some lessons from his current dilemma regarding ‘handing over sovereignty’ in Iraq. But he evidently did not. For there is every likelihood that governance in Gaza will face a similar problem of legitimacy after the Israeli withdrawal. It may become a power vacuum ‘black hole’ when the Israelis pull out. Or it may be ruled by an unholy alliance of a thoroughly discredited Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Either scenario can inspire only deep apprehension.

Dot 2. President Bush continues to exhort the Arabs to play a bigger role in Iraq, despite opposition to this war by virtually every Middle Eastern country. Does the Sharon deal make their participation more or less likely?

Dot 3. Mr. Bush presses on with his Greater Middle East Initiative, a plan to ‘bring democracy’ to the autocracies and dictatorships of the neighborhood. The Arab Middle East has roundly rejected the Bush Initiative as a neo-colonial effort to impose reforms externally. They reasonably complain that they were never consulted. Is the Sharon decision likely to make them more receptive?

Dot 4. In Mr. Bush’s ‘roadmap’ for Israeli-Palestinian peace, such issues as Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and Palestinians’ ‘right of return’ were supposed to be negotiated by the two parties, with the US as ‘honest broker’.. US displeasure with Israeli settlements has been a staple of American policy for more than 20 years, though the administration is widely perceived abroad to favor Israel over the Palestinians. With a single action, Mr. Bush has confirmed that perception and given away two of the Palestinians’ major bargaining chips.

Dot 5. The US is fighting a global war against terrorists. This is a war that cannot be won by the US acting alone. It needs help, lots of help. And much of this help has by definition to come from the countries that have spawned this generation of jihadists in the first place. Most of these countries are in the Middle East. Did the Bush administration consider the impact of its Sharon deal on America’s top priority?

These five issues are indivisible, but are being treated by the Bush administration as separate and unrelated. The President and many others in the US Government have bravely portrayed Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza as a positive step in the roadmap. The Bush administration even managed to convince Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that Israel’s proposed unilateral action could be a net plus for the Palestinians, and got the aging Egyptian leader to offer to train the Palestinian police.

But the price of Mr. Mubarak’s heading home empty-handed is likely to return to bite Mr. Bush in the very near future. Mr. Mubarak is a big hitter among the 22 Arab states that are members of the gravely dysfunctional Arab League. This impotent organization has long used the Palestinian-Israeli issue as a rhetorical blunt object; warning that nothing in the Middle East can show progress while this running sore festers. The Arabs have done little to help resolve this issue, and they are now likely to do even less. Mr. Bush’s action will serve only to raise the Arab decibel level and give them another generation to use this issue as cover for their lack of development and political will.

Messrs. Bush and Sharon each have domestic political reasons to reach an agreement, with the US presidential election less than eight months away and Sharon's Likud Party due to vote soon on his strategy of disengaging from the Palestinians. Mr. Bush’s decision may well help him win more Jewish votes in November. But he is likely to pay an unacceptably high cost to many of his other plans and dreams. And so will the United States.

Connect the dots, Mr. Bush!











Monday, April 12, 2004

ARAB REFORMS: YES, BUT WHEN?

Feedback to: wfisher206@aol.com


By William Fisher

Over the past year or two, we have been bombarded with chatter about the political and social reforms taking place in the Middle East and North Africa. We have been given endless illustrations of changes that have been implemented, but also told that (a) change must come from within and (b) change will come slowly. There can be little argument with the ‘from within’ part. But the ‘slowly’ part needs to be questioned. The question is: when does ‘slowly’ become a farce?

Those who defend the current pace of change cite numerous reasons, principally ‘cultural’ considerations, the US invasion of Iraq, the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and the need to stop terrorists. But I submit that these are largely straw men. For the most part, the ‘cultural’ considerations constraining reform have been created by the area’s kings and presidents. Most of the countries in the area live under so-called ‘emergency laws’ that give their governments sweeping powers to arrest and detain citizens without charge, stifle dissent, and disband political parties. What we hear is that ending these draconian laws would unleash a torrent of rhetorical and physical violence that would engulf the region. But to be fearful of rhetoric is to be fearful of freedom. And well-trained and non-corrupt police departments can be trained to deal with physical violence. As to stopping terrorists, it is questionable whether these laws have any effect whatever. Terrorists expect to operate outside the law. Catching them should be the work of intelligence experts and law enforcement.

The history of these laws leads to one conclusion only: they are intended to preserve the power of those who already have it. And that is the problem with the ‘slowly’ part of the equation.

The fact is that Middle East and North African rulers fear their people. They worry that, given more civil and political freedoms, the people would rise up and seize power. But how would they know? Most of them have never asked their people for anything save supine obedience, so have no reason to trust their judgment or love of country. The result of this deep-seated suspicion is that the gulf between the governors and the governed has become a chasm, and – despite a few largely cosmetic ‘reforms’ -- is getting wider. It is a sort of ‘separate but unequal’ doctrine.

Last year, a group of Arab scholars worked with the United Nations Development Programme to prepare The Arab Development Report – without question a historic inside-out piece of work. This remarkable document posited two basic requirements for sound governance: transparency and accountability. The rulers of Arab nations can demonstrate neither. The process of governance in the region is incredible opaque. And most of those in power are publicly accountable to no one.

What is the state of reform in the key Arab states?

In Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom’s first human rights organization recently won Royal approval; the government has promised municipal elections, opened a reform dialogue with leading intellectuals, arrested several thousand radical clergy, and introduced changes to its education and religious institutions, which promote an austere version of Sunni Islam. Saudi Arabia’s crown prince has created an Advisory Working Group to study the major challenges facing the kingdom, including the implementation of municipal elections, with full voting rights granted to women. But the Saudis recently arrested eight of its intellectuals for signing a petition urging the government to provide a timetable for reforms. According to the official Saudi Press Agency, the signatories’ actions did not “serve national unity or the cohesion of society based on Islamic Sharia law.''

Egypt and Morocco have also formed human rights committees, attached to their governments, promising independent action, but lacking any enforcement authority. Egypt’s human rights group is headed by former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali, a Coptic Christian. Boutros-Gali surprised many observers by calling for repeal of Egypt’s Emergency Laws. President Hosni Mubarak has talked of a wide-ranging reform agenda, starting with a promise to stop jailing journalists.

Jordan’s King Abdullah II has pledged to transform kingdom into the "model of a democratic Arab Islamic state" that can serve as an example to other Middle East nations. He has abolished the Information Ministry that enforced censorship and put more women into government, but broader public freedoms are still lacking.

Syria has done next to nothing in the reform area. President Bashir Assad, who took office when his father died in 2000, initially took limited steps to loosen Syria from the totalitarian system he inherited. He released hundreds of political detainees and initially allowed political discussion groups to hold small gatherings indoors. But in 2001, Assad’s police began to clamp down on pro-democracy activists. Recently, Syrian police dispersed and then arrested a small group of protestors seeking repeal of the so-called Emergency Laws in force since 1963.

In North Africa, Tunisia has made negligible political progress since President Ben Ali seized power in 1987. Since then, he has had himself re-elected three times, on each occasion claiming more than 99 percent of the vote. He recently pushed through constitutional changes that would allow him to remain in power through 2014. According to Human Rights Watch, Tunisia’s record in the human rights area is appalling. Algeria, a multiparty state with an elected parliament and president, has created a ‘mechanism’ to try to discover what happened to the thousands of ‘disappeared’ citizens. Morocco’s King Mohammed VI appoints the prime minister and members of the government following legislative elections, but can fire any minister, dissolve parliament, call for new elections, or rule by decree.

Arab leaders feel the West fails to understand the problems they face in attempting to improve governance. Most of them opposed the US Greater Middle East Initiative as a neo-colonialist measure designed to impose democracy from outside. Many Arab leaders continue to blame their problems on the US invasion of Iraq and failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. According to a recent editorial in the Jordan Times, “The continuation of conflicts in the Middle East, especially the Arab-Israeli deadlock and the Iraqi occupation, leads to radicalization of the entire region and makes the endeavors to reform it that much more difficult. The rise of political violence and even terrorism is directly linked to these festering conflicts and without security and stability, no political and economic reforms can be pursued with much success…” On the other hand, some Middle East observers feel that Arab leaders have conveniently hidden behind the Israeli-Palestinian issue for years to justify their inaction in reform.

But the Arab reform issue predates Iraq and even the Palestinian intifida. For example, had the Arab League not cancelled its meeting in Tunis last month, one of its agenda items would have been consideration of several amendments to strengthen the 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights. However, no Arab state has ever ratified the 1994 Charter.

Despite this sorry record, the rulers of the Middle East would do well to re-read the Arab Development Report. That report identifies knowledge, freedom and women’s empowerment as the most serious challenges to development. It notes that the whole Arab world translates only 300 books annually; 65 million Arab adults, including half the women, are illiterate; only 1.6 percent of the Arab population has Internet access; 14 million Arab adults do not make enough money to buy even the most basic necessities; steep population increases in many Arab countries mean that as many as 50 million more Arab workers will enter the job market in the next eight years, looking for very few jobs; and other advancements in communications, transportation, health and educational opportunities have yet to reach large percentages of the people of the Greater Middle East. It contends that this predicament contributes to the misunderstanding and prejudice that in turn leads to violence.

Enter Islam. Contrary to widely held beliefs in the West, it is not Islam that breeds terrorists. It is the juxtaposition of some radical clergy, mosques and religious schools with the poverty, hunger, deprivation and frustration of ordinary people that facilitates their exploitation by an extremist misinterpretation of Islam.

These are challenging problems. But they are problems governments are expected to address. And most of these are governments that have received and can expect to continue to receive massive assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. The world has shown it is prepared to help. What is needed now is not continued repression but help from the recipients of this assistance – and their people.

But the people have little incentive, let alone opportunity, to help. There are few parts of the world plagued by such a pervasive combination of frustration and resignation about the inevitability of the status quo. The have-nots in these societies are without hope. Yet hope is the biggest incentive of all, and it is the job of political leadership to inspire it. However, hope cannot be inspired by rhetoric alone; it must be accompanied by action, by demonstrable change. To most of the ‘Arab Street’, the modest ‘reforms’ adopted thus far are meaningless.

Isn’t it time the leaders of the Arab nations decided to test the will, the energy, and the innovativeness of their people? They could well be surprised by the national benefits of what many of them regard as a high-risk strategy.