Friday, February 22, 2013

Let’s See Who Blinks First


By William Fisher

During my years in Cairo, I was often invited to dinner at the apartments of Egyptian colleagues. On this night, the apartment building was a high-rise located in a middle class neighborhood close to downtown. As we entered the tiny lobby, I couldn’t help seeing that it was littered with a smorgasbord of junk, making it all but impassable.

Old fridges. Baby beds. Jagged concrete boulders from construction. Toys. Books. You name it. The junk continued to block our way as we headed for the flight of stairs that led to my friend’s apartment. It was the same between apartment doors on the first floor.

“Why are all these things here?” I asked.

My colleague answered: “This is how most Egyptians think of one another. Inside our apartments everything is neat and modern. Out here – in the halls and lobby – everything belongs to all the residents and none. No one has any obligation to help anyone else.”

And then he added this really strange remark: “That’s why the NGOs are so important to this country. We don’t have a long or strong history of voluntarism yet. People helping people is a Western – mostly American – concept and it’s still young and fragile. And it has been fighting for freedom since Mubarak took over from Sadat. That’s why the current persecution couldn’t have come at a worse time.” (we had been discussing NGOs earlier in the day.)

·        If this were a discussion of American NGOs, we’d be mentioning names like the American Civil Liberties Union,  Save the Children, the Sierra Club and the American Cancer Society. Not only are they not persecuted, these names are the epicenter of our civil society. These are the groups that don’t work for a profit, and raise billions for their constituents and those who represent them in the Government. They’re the outfits that remind us of what  Franklin Roosevelt told a group of reformers in 1932, Roosevelt told them: "I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it."

·        By which he meant to use the power of the people to take up those causes that demand action by political leaders who would rather play it safe and do as little as possible.

But in Egypt, the persecution of NGOs was indeed nothing new. Egyptian NGOs had been battling government political interference from Day One of the Mubarak regime. There had been NGO shutdowns and court trials and first the conviction of Saad Eddin Ibrahim followed two trials later by his exoneration. One of the country’s human rights pioneers was accused of accepting a European Union grant to make a film about political parties. A coup in the US; a criminal offense in Egypt.

Supporters of NGOs were looking toward a new spirit in the land and a new lease on life for their organizations. Now, on the cusp of the January 25th Revolution, things were about to get a lot worse. A new NGO law was being drafted and, from the sound of the gossip, it would stifle freedom even more egregiously than the expiring law.

There were some 30,00O NGOs in a country of 83.6 million -- a relatively small number – and many of them were NGOs on paper only. They needed funding, training, field experience. This new law was going cut their possibilities substantially. There are 1.5 million NGOs in the US.

While advocating for human rights may make the most noise, the names of these organizations are mostly unknown except to those in the NGO field, Egypt’s 30,000 NGOs are dedicated to a wide variety of causes – from politically charged situations such as the Nile water supply to community gardens being planted by neighbors. Obviously the political causes are those that give the government the  biggest migraines.

We are still a decade away from January 25, 2012 and the fall of Mubarak. Before the election of President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt was ruled by the military following Mubarak’s fall from power. And it was the military – the temporary SCAF – Supreme Council of Armed Forces -- who initiated arguably the most severe punishment in the history of the NGO movement. There would be arrests. There would be a new NGO law even more draconian than those of the past two decades.

This ominous portent triggered perhaps the most furiously frustrated statement ever issued by the blue-chip Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) in 2012.

Here’s part of the unsigned statement the Institute wrote:

·                    ‘For the past year and a half, Egypt’s NGOs have
been targeted through a systematic chain of repressive violations, culminating in an orchestrated smear campaign led by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and its interim cabinets. During this transitional period, the prospects of civil society and human rights advocacy in Egypt faced several endangering threats. The current government is now faced with archaic laws that are in need of change if civil society is to thrive going forward.

·                    ‘Various NGOs were targeted because of their role in exposing human rights violations committed by the former regime. It was these very violations that paved the way not only for the January 25th Revolution, but also for continuous pressure towards fulfilling the people’s demands after Mubarak’s ouster.’

The statement got more apoplectic as it progressed.

“Under SCAF’s rule, human rights organizations tried to contribute to what they hoped would be a democratic transition. NGOs advocated for the adoption of several democratic initiatives aimed primarily at providing a legislative and reformist platform for the restructuring of state institutions, the statement said, adding:

“SCAF’s lack of political will to restructure state institutions on the one hand, and NGO pressure from the other is believed to be one of the main reasons behind SCAF’s smear campaign against civil society groups, which was put into motion by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.”

The CIHRS statement charged that the government never intended to encourage a freer civil society. The. former Minister of International Cooperation, Fayza Abul-Naga, said that an NGO’s ‘real’ role is “helping the government in developmental fields which is more beneficial than just criticizing the government’s policies.” This was the road the government had in mind for NGO. It would effectively shift their focus away from advocating for basic human rights – the most serious and most dangerous task taken on by NGOs in a country whose police and security forces were corrupt and whose prisons were poster children for torture and death in detention.

The government’s standard trojan horse against violations by NGOs was legitimized by whitewashing the regime’s appearance. “A repressive NGO law regulated civil society and ensured NGO’s human rights advocacy programs had limited impact.  The law guaranteed that conditions under which the NGOs operated were restrictive, with sources of funding and all activities monitored and subject to state security approval,” the statement said.
It continued: “The wording of the law was intentionally ambiguous, making it easy to prohibit organizations from engaging in political or trade union activities, facilitating state repression of NGOs.  It also prohibited foreign funding in all its forms (donations or grants without advance approval of the Minister of Social Affairs)

After Mubarak’s ouster, NGOs tried to change the law, to ensure it respected the universal standards of freedom of association and guaranteed the existence of a free civil society in Egypt that could advocate for human rights. Some 39 NGOs signed a new draft law that met these standards, while also removing the power of the Ministry of Social Affairs over NGOs.

The CIHRS statement alleged that “at around the same time, the government launched an investigation into several organizations following a statement by US Ambassador Anne Patterson that local groups had received more than $40 million in funding from the US government.” It added that her statements “galvanized suspicions about NGO funding, and were a major push for what came next.”

Last December, while security forces were trying to discover documents supporting their view that foreign donations were funding the protests in Tahrir Square. The Government said the protests were “spreading chaos and inciting violence.”
Measures were taken to limit NGO funding of organizations, as was the case with the “New Woman Foundation”, CEWLA, a feminist organization, and the Arab Program for Human Rights Activists, the statement charged.
.
This reporter is without first-hand information about Ambassador Anne Patterson and why she disclosed the funding of $40,000 for the two small women’s programs.

But I can report based on first hand observation my attendance at one of the US-sponsored “democracy” Institutes, where senior officials of the Mubarak regime were seated in the audience listening to a very professional English-language lecture on modern political parties and their care and feeding.

I can also report that in about this same time period, approaching the turn of the century, USAID launched an NGO Center to teach local NGO officials about administrative tasks such as planning special events, launching fund-raising campaigns, and holding elections. Given the Government’s attitudes toward NGOs, it is just about impossible to understand why this NGO Center ever got off the ground (though it had a very short life). It is inconceivable that the Government was unaware of its existence, since every program introduced by USAID must be “requested” by the host government.

The attack on the foreign funding issue reached a head during a raid on several international NGOs, the CIHRS statement said.  The Government was shifting its emphasis toward a more aggressive approach in dealing with civil society in Egypt, and “resulted in the referral of several employees from these organizations to criminal prosecution in a trial that is ongoing to this day,” the statement read. The trial has been postponed a number of times, while non-Egyptian defendants have flown back to their home countries but have sworn to return for the trial. Meanwhile, NGOs are drafting “a new law that would put an end to state repression of these organizations.”

With the election of President Mohamed Morsi, “NGOs hoped that the president’s promises would be fulfilled, and that he would break from an inherited restrictive legacy, which includes the notorious NGO law,’ the statement said, adding:

“The first 60 days of his presidency would prove otherwise. Security forces have continued to violently disperse protests, watched over the displacement of Christians, and detained dozens of civilians following bloody clashes between citizens and the
police.”

POMED, the Project on Middle East Democracy, told this reporter, “The so-called ‘foreign-funded’ NGO trial is still moving its way through the Cairo criminal court. In February 2012, 43 U.S. and local NGO workers were charged with receiving foreign funding without proper government approval in violation of law no.84/2002. The defendants’ lawyers were able to present documents that detailed the expenditures of the NGOs involved in the case, to try and disprove government claims that the funds were used for nefarious purposes. Documents further showed that the Egyptian government had prior knowledge and approval of at least $33 million of funding to the accused NGOs.”
But many, in Egyptian as well as foreign government circles, are hopeful that this trial will never happen. The US has made it clear that such a trial could have a negative effect on the current $1.3 billion in military aid it has been giving Egypt since Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty in 1979.

In a letter to the SCAF (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces), Daphne McCurdy, a Senior Research Associate with POMED said: “These groups have worked transparently and in cooperation with Egyptian authorities to help support Egypt’s democratic transition—a goal to which the ruling military council purports to be committed. Sixteen of those charged are American citizens, seriously threatening the future of the U.S.-Egypt relationship.”
Internally, the new Egyptian government seems set on passing a new NGO law that is widely criticized as more restrictive, according to POMED – the Project on Middle East Democracy, a credible US-based NGO.

What’s the bottom line here? It is that we can’t want representative government more than the Egyptians want it. And, at least in respect to NGOs, they don’t appear to want it.

They are not the least bit interested in having creative, vibrant organizations capable of improving on government-fashioned policies and practices. If the good ideas aren’t coming from the government, maybe there aren’t any good ideas!

My friend Lu Rudel, one of our very first Foreign Service Officers, is fond of telling me about another Arab Awakening) in which it took Ataturk 100 years to bring law and order to Turkey.

Well, it looks like the Egyptians are going to require the same degree of patience.

Monday, February 18, 2013

Bahrain: Will Dialogue Bring Peace?


By William Fisher

After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”

Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.

“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”

She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”

The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally a against Shi’ite Iran.

At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.

This will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.

Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.

While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.

Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.
The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.

It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”
This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.

The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.

But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?

So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.

More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.

Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.

However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:

The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.

For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.

The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.

Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.

A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.

And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,

“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”

He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.

A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.

Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.

America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”

Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.

“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”

Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.

The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.

The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.

As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.

With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.

The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.
Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.

With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.

Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:

“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.

In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.

Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:

  •  Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.
• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.

• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.
• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.

• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.

• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.
So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.
















































































































































































































































































.

Saturday, February 16, 2013

Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?


By William Fisher

After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”

Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.

“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”

She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”

The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally against Shi’ite Iran.

At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.

This is will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.

Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.

While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.

Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.

The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.

It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”

This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.

The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.

But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?

So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.

More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.

Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.

However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:

The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.

For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.

The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.
Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.

A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.



And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,



“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”



He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.



America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”



Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly

radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.



“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political

malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”



Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.



The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.



The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.

As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.
Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.

With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.

The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.
Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.

With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.

Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:

“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.

In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.

Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:

· Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.

• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.

• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.
• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.

• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.

• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.

So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.








































































































































































































































































Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?




William Fisher



After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”



Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.



“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”



She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”



The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally a

against Shi’ite Iran.



At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.



This will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.



Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.



While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.



Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.



The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.



It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”



This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.



The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.



But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?



So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.



More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.



Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.



However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.



The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:



The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.



For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.



Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.



A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.



And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,



“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”



He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.



America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”



Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly

radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.



“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political

malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”



Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.



The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.



The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.



Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.



The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.



Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:



“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.



In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.



Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:



· Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.



• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.



• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.





So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.



END










































































































































































































































































Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?




William Fisher



After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”



Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.



“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”



She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”



The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally a

against Shi’ite Iran.



At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.



This will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.



Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.



While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.



Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.



The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.



It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”



This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.



The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.



But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?



So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.



More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.



Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.



However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.



The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:



The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.



For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.



Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.



A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.



And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,



“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”



He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.



America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”



Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly

radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.



“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political

malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”



Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.



The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.



The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.



Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.



The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.



Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:



“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.



In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.



Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:



· Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.



• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.



• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.





So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.



END



































































































































































































































































Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?




William Fisher



After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”



Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.



“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”



She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”



The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally a

against Shi’ite Iran.



At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.



This will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.



Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.



While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.



Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.



The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.



It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”



This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.



The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.



But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?



So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.



More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.



Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.



However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.



The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:



The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.



For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.



Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.



A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.



And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,



“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”



He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.



America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”



Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly

radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.



“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political

malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”



Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.



The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.



The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.



Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.



The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.



Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:



“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.



In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.



Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:



· Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.



• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.



• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.





So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.



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