Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?

By William Fisher

After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”

Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.

“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”

She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”

The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally against Shi’ite Iran.

At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.

This is will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.

Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.

While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.

Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.

The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.

It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”

This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.

The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.

But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?

So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.

More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.

Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.

However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:

The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.

For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.

The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.
Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.

A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.



And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,



“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”



He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.



America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”



Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly

radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.



“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political

malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”



Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.



The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.



The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.

As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.
Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.

With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.

The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.
Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.

With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.

Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:

“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.

In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.

Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:

· Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.

• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.

• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.
• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.

• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.

• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.

So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.








































































































































































































































































Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?




William Fisher



After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”



Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.



“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”



She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”



The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally a

against Shi’ite Iran.



At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.



This will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.



Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.



While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.



Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.



The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.



It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”



This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.



The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.



But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?



So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.



More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.



Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.



However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.



The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:



The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.



For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.



Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.



A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.



And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,



“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”



He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.



America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”



Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly

radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.



“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political

malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”



Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.



The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.



The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.



Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.



The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.



Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:



“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.



In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.



Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:



· Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.



• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.



• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.





So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.



END










































































































































































































































































Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?




William Fisher



After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”



Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.



“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”



She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”



The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally a

against Shi’ite Iran.



At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.



This will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.



Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.



While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.



Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.



The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.



It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”



This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.



The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.



But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?



So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.



More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.



Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.



However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.



The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:



The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.



For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.



Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.



A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.



And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,



“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”



He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.



America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”



Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly

radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.



“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political

malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”



Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.



The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.



The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.



Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.



The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.



Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:



“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.



In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.



Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:



· Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.



• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.



• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.





So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.



END



































































































































































































































































Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?




William Fisher



After two years of civil unrest, death, torture and destruction, the King of Bahrain finally sat down with his subjects last week for the start of a much-delayed “National Dialogue” designed to bring “meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens.”



Those were the words of U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, speaking on Monday after what must have been months of hyper-diplomatic arm-twisting.



“The United States welcomes the start of Bahrain’s National Dialogue. We’re encouraged by the broad participation of Bahraini political groups in the dialogue.”



She added, “We view the dialogue as a positive step in a broader process that can result in meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of all of Bahrain’s citizens. We believe that efforts to promote engagement and reconciliation among Bahrainis are necessary to long-term stability.”



The tiny, oil rich state is strategically located and is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In early 2011, protests erupted led by majority Shi'ite Muslims, who include the King and the Royal Family. The Shi'ite Muslims, who claim they are discriminated against, demanded an end to the Sunni-led monarchy's political domination and full powers for parliament. Shi'ite Muslims complain of discrimination in the electoral system, jobs, housing, education and government departments. The U.S. views Bahrain as an ally a

against Shi’ite Iran.



At the beginning of the serious unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered Saudi troops to drive over the causeway that separates the two countries. Saudi troops assisted Bahraini police and security forces in quelling the unrest.



This will be the second time the government and opposition groups have attempted to organize a national dialogue. Earlier, the largest democracy group, Wefaq, and five other groups, have said they are ready to participate in the talks but have called for a constitutional democracy with an elected government rather than one appointed by the king.



Thirty-five people died during the unrest and two months of martial law that followed, but the opposition says that number has risen to more than 80. The government rejects the figure.



While martial law has ended and the government has introduced what most observers regard as minor reforms, the opposition says the measures are cosmetic.



Fifteen months ago, the King of Bahrain received a 500-page report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The report contained the Commission’s findings regarding the February-March 2011 popular uprising and the government’s heavy-handed response.



The King and his government were widely hailed for commissioning and then personally receiving the report, which described in detail the frequent use of excessive force by security forces, the systemic abuse and torture of detainees, mass discrimination and dismissals of workers and students, and grave violations of medical neutrality.



It highlighted a culture of impunity prevalent among government officials at all levels, concluding that many abuses “could not have happened without the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure.”



This report was no inside job. The shocker here was that the report was commissioned by the King himself, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah, and funded and carried out under the supervision of an independent team headed by an Egyptian judge with an impeccable reputation for fairness.



The King’s decisions to both commission and accept the report was hailed by some in the international community as an extraordinary act of political leadership. It was seen by many as a potentially critical step toward resolving the country’s escalating political crisis.



But world leaders wondered: Could this really be happening? Would the Sovereign really be prepared to expose the shortcomings of his regime to the very adversaries who focused public attention on these very same shortcomings?



So, while many praised the King, others did not. Many did not fully understand why the King was taking these unconventional actions, and were suspicious of His Majesty’s motives and strategy. They worried that he was simply stalling, buying time and hoping his opposition would fade away.



More than a year later, most observers in the international community believe they have their answer. What fundamental reforms recommended by the BICI were actually implemented? Virtually none say Bahrain-watchers.



Next to nothing! The tiny, oil-rich, and strategically located nation continues to put out near-daily cotton-candy press releases and, according to the major think-tanks focused on Bahrain, at the same time continues to be wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political reforms.



However, through the government press apparatus and high-powered PR consultants, it appears more than ready to continue launching a tsunami of what I regard as largely insignificant developments as “news” – though the chances of finding actual news in these documents are somewhere between slim and none.



The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published the following descriptions of the current situation:



The three main Bahraini political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists.



For the U.S., which docks its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, this impasse looms as a crucial test of America’s ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



The US has been unsuccessful in persuading various players to embrace a robust dialogue to come up with practical and equitable solutions to the island’s deep-seated problems. The CarnegieFoundation sees this failure as a sign of increased anti-Americanism in Bahrain and the waning influence American wields in the area.



Even before the BICI report was commissioned, Bahrain hired some of the most high-powered New York public relations firms to keep us all informed about how well things were going and the substantial number of the report’s recommendations were actually being implemented. This reporter can affirm that many follow-up questions to the press office from journalists went unanswered.



A lot of the pushback against “political reform by press release” came from the daughter and one of the sisters of arguably the country’s leading human rights defenders. Both were imprisoned by the government, the father for a life sentence. The un-jailed daughter was working from outside Bahrain. She was trying with limited resources to match the blizzard of press releases launched into the in-boxes of Western journalists.



And Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey writes,



“And while assessments of the Royal Family’s commitment to genuine, comprehensive reform continue, those doing the assessing have been unable to transparently provide evidence to support such claims and allow access for outside observers to confirm such claims independently.”



He adds, “They have been unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support. The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices. Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.



America needs to “Rethink the long-standing U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain. The relationship may soon become a liability given the stalemate on reform, endemic violence, and mounting anti-Americanism.”



Wehrey concludes: Two years after the uprising that shook its foundations, Bahrain is a broken country, wracked by simmering violence and social polarization. Its Sunni-dominated government shows little willingness to implement substantial reforms and its young citizens—both Sunni and Shia—are becoming increasingly

radicalized. Its once-vibrant economy is stagnant.



“As of early 2013, over 100 people have been killed in violence related to the uprising. Successive efforts to resolve the impasse have failed, largely due to deep divisions within the country’s three main camps. Within the royal family, a hardline faction has come to dominate the government’s response, framing the crisis as a security problem rather than a symptom of a broader political

malaise that requires sweeping reforms.”



Among the opposition similar splits have arisen between an institutionalized current that is receptive to dialogue and advocates gradual change within the context of the monarchy, and more youthful, rejectionist networks who employ confrontational street tactics and demand the end of the monarchy.



The Sunni Islamist field has witnessed similar fissures, between loyalists and a more genuine opposition. Underpinning all of these dynamics is a creeping sectarianism at the societal level and disturbing levels of anti-Americanism.



The United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



As the crisis persists, troubling questions have arisen about the deleterious effects of America’s strategic relationship with Bahrain, which has long been a central pillar in U.S. power projection in the Gulf. Most crucially, Bahrain serves as the seat of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and it hosts a number of U.S. air and special operations capabilities. But increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image. Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.



Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful reforms, more forceful and public engagement with key leaders, and using multilateral forums to sanction regime infractions.



The goal of all of these efforts should be raising the economic and political costs for hardliners who would block reforms while increasingly, the United States finds itself in the undesirable position of maintaining close ties with a repressive regime that has skillfully avoided meaningful reforms while engaging in a concerted public relations campaign to burnish its image.



Ultimately, breaking through Bahrain’s impasse is not just a matter of promoting human rights but mitigating potential security challenges to U.S. assets and people and—eventually, perhaps—forestalling a violent challenge to the monarchy.

Backed by robust Saudi financial and military support, the Bahraini regime may be able to hobble through the current crisis, withstanding extraordinary pressure from both its own citizenry and the international community. But the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely.



With the likely fall of the Alawite-dominated government in Syria, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family will soon be the only sectarian minority in the Middle East ruling over a majority that has little-to-no say in its government. Recent history suggests that, absent sweeping structural changes, the outcome for such an arrangement will not be peaceful.



Other observers have reached similar conclusions. In a separate report published in the Washington Post, Stephen McInerney, executive director of POMED (the Project on Middle East Democracy) quoted former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, She said:



“Our challenge in a country like Bahrain,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last November, is that the United States “has many complex interests. We’ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The growing problem is that the United States does plenty of “walking” — maintaining our strategic alliance with the Gulf kingdom in the short term — but little or no “chewing,” or taking meaningful steps to spur the political reforms needed to preserve Bahrain as an ally in the long term.



In recent weeks, Bahrain’s government has banned demonstrations of any size and upheld lengthy prison sentences given to teachers and medics for expressing their political views. It continues to crack down violently against daily protests. Washington has repeatedly expressed “concern” about the state of human rights in Bahrain, but it is increasingly clear that such statements have little or no impact.



Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, weighs in this way:



· Bahrain is wracked by simmering violence and social divisions, and the government appears unwilling to enact substantial political forces—the Shia opposition, Sunni Islamists, and the ruling Sunni Al Khalifa family—are paralyzed by internal fissures with more militant idealists overtaking pragmatists. This is a crucial test of the United States’ ability to balance the need for political reform with long-standing strategic interests and military partnerships.



• Unable to produce meaningful reforms through dialogue or political participation, the mainstream Shia opposition represented by Al Wefaq is losing popular support.



• The youth are rising up. The February 14 Youth Coalition—a leaderless network formed in the early days of Bahrain’s uprising—is winning over some of Al Wefaq’s supporters. It has rejected dialogue with the regime, called for the creation of a republic, and confronted security forces with sporadic violence.



• A hardline faction of the Al Khalifa family, led by the royal court minister and the commander of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), is drowning out more moderate voices.



• Class-based Sunni anger with the regime is rising. Hardline royal factions have attempted to co-opt this dissent and redirect it against the Shia—a losing strategy that is stoking sectarianism in Bahraini society.



• Anti-Americanism is growing among both hardline Sunni Islamists and rejectionist Shia elements. This anti-Americanism coupled with the entrenched regime’s apparent intent to ignore calls for deep reform risks damaging American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. assets and people.





So the deeply divided factions will continue to demand justice and equity, and have demonstrated more than enough courage to make life extremely difficult for all the players. It may be especially difficult for the U.S., which pro-democracy forces are hoping will advocate quietly, behind-the curtain, for an end to discrimination.



END













































































































































































































































































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.Will Bahrainis Finally Dialogue?













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Presidential Power

By William Fisher

There must be something in the air when a person gets to be President.

These leaders spend their entire lives rhapsodizing about checks and balances, due process, transparency and the rule of law. Yet five minutes after their inauguration you hear them beginning to distance themselves (that’s Washington-speak for deniability) from these foundational truths.

Presidents always seem to come up with tiny reasons why the whole promise can’t be kept today, but surely will be kept soon. These days we hear a lot about compromise being the reason. No one side in a compromise can have 100% of what he/she wants, or has been promised. So we’re all exhorted to settle for a little less than we were expecting. Months later, we learn down the road (where the can is) that the whole production has been scrapped – our leaders worked really hard perfecting their initial press release, a small group of them held a news conference, it made cable news, and now it’s on to matters of greater moment.

It is said that in Washington, the most dangerous place to be is between a politician and a camera. Well, not always. When our statesmen and women have fully distanced themselves from whatever promise they made, it’s time for another recess, not another camera.

Why do they do what they do? Well, a lot of folks in Washington think it’s nothing more than a naked play for more and more Presidential power. Others think a stronger President will be more successful politically. Still others think a President’s motivation plays a big role: The more power he gets, the better he will be able to protect the people he’s sworn to protect.

This is nothing new. It’s happened to almost all our Presidents, even to some we now think of as transformational. The Constitutional Rights Foundation tells us that when John Adams succeeded George Washington as president in 1797, the Federalist Party had controlled Congress and the rest of the national government from the beginning of the new nation. Adams and the other Federalists believed that their political party was the government. The Federalists believed that once the people had elected their political leaders, no one should publicly criticize them.

Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, which had stiff implications – and jail terms – for critics of John Adams, whom most of us now think of as one of our great presidents, regardless of political party.

Lincoln didn’t escape the bubble either. In the first year of our Civil War, Lincoln suspended use of the writ of habeas corpus – one of our oldest and most revered legal principals. “By stripping the courts of habeas jurisdiction over detainees, the U.S. would be signaling to the rest of the world that it is not bound by the rule of law in its treatment of them,” says Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch.

Our 28th President, Woodrow Wilson, also belongs in the panoply of American leaders who supported civil liberties being held hostage to the demands of security. The Sedition Act of 1918 extended the Espionage Act of 1917 to cover a broader range of offenses, notably speech and the expression of opinion that cast the government or the war effort in a negative light or interfered with the sale of government bonds. Litigation under this law sent the renowned Socialist political leader, Eugene V. Debs, to prison.

Wilson was also a supporter of the so-called “Red Raids” by his Attorney General, Mitchell Palmer, and his new sidekick, J. Edgar Hoover. Hundreds of US citizens and others were suspected of being Bolsheviks and were deported.
And so it went. Franklin Delano Roosevelt uprooted 110,000 Japanese-Americans and Japanese citizens and settled them involuntarily in internment camps. In he Cold War following WWII, we had Richard Nixon and the House un-American Affairs Committee and Senator Joe McCarthy witch-hunting people’s lives and decimating careers.

Later, Bill Clinton came up with “extraordinary rendition,” in which suspected terrorists are kidnapped and flown to countries that practice torture. George W. Bush secretly developed the so-called “enhanced interrogation” programs and their “Black Site” secret prisons, lied to the American people about “warrantless” eavesdropping on the private phone and email traffic of citizens charged with no crime, and then absolved the phone companies of responsibility for illegally helping the government.

Now, Barack Obama, who promised the most transparent administration in US history, admits he is going to use unmanned aircraft to assassinate those who would harm the U.S., be they citizens or not, whether or not they are close to a recognized battlefield – all without charges, trial, due process, et cetera.

And scariest of all, he is going to do it alone! No oversight! No court! No accountability.

Simply put, the “legal memos” notwithstanding, this has to be the most outrageous rape of the Constitution in the history of our country. In the interests of more and more Presidential Power.

And still worse: According to the polls, the American people like the idea!

The Gatekeepers –An Analysis

By Lawrence Davidson

Prof. Davidson teaches history at West Chester University in West Chester, Pa. This is a guest contribution. 

There is a new documentary movie about Israel, called The Gatekeepers. It is directed by Dror Moreh, and features interviews with all the former leaders of the Shin Bet, the country’s internal security organization. The Shin Bet is assigned the job of preventing Palestinian retaliatory attacks on Israel and, as described by Moreh, the film “is the story of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories as told by the people at the crossroads of some of the most crucial moments in the security history of the country.” Along the way it touches on such particular topics as targeted assassinations, the use of torture, and “collateral damage.”

The Gatekeepers has garnered a lot of acclaim. It has played at film festivals in Jerusalem, Amsterdam, New York, Toronto and Venice, and elsewhere. It has received critical acclaim from critics and won the Los Angeles Film Critics Association’s Best Documentary Award. It has been nominated for an Oscar.
Part II — The Messages
In order to promote the The Gatekeepers, Morah has been doing interviews and recently appeared on CNN with Christiane Amanpour. He made a number of points, as did the Shin Bet leaders in the clips featured during the interview. I shall review and critique some of these below.

– Moreh says that “if there is someone who understands the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it’s these guys” (the Shin Bet leaders). Actually, this not necessarily true. One might more accurately claim that these men, who led Israel’s most secretive government institution, were and are so deeply buried inside their country’s security dilemma that they see it in a distorted fashion (with only occasional glimmers of clarity). For instance:

– Avraham Shalom (head of the Shin Bet from 1981-1986), tells us that “Israel lost touch with how to coexist with the Palestinians as far back as the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967….When the country started doubling down on terrorism.” But is this really the case? One might more accurately assert that Israel had no touch to lose. Most of its Jewish population and leadership has never had any interest in coexistence with Palestinians in any equalitarian and humane sense of the term. The interviewed security chiefs focus on the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza because they are the ones who offered the most resistance to conquest. But what of the 20% of the population of Israel who are also Palestinian and who actually lived under martial law until 1966? You may call the discriminatory regime under which these people live “coexistence,” but it is the coexistence of superior over the inferior secured largely by intimidation.

–Moreh also insists that it is the “Jewish extremists inside Israel” who have been the “major impediment” to resolving issues between Israel and the Palestinians. The film looks at the cabal of religious fanatics, who in 1980, planned to blow up the sacred Muslim shrine of the Dome of the Rock on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, as well as the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995. Yet, as dangerous as are Israel’s right-wing extremists and settler fanatics, focusing exclusively on them obscures the full history of the occupation.

By the time Menachem Begin and Israel’s right-wing fanatics took power in 1977, the process of occupation and ethnic cleansing was well under way. It had been initiated, both against the Arab Israelis from 1948 onward, and against the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza after 1967, by the so-called Israeli Left: the Labor Party and such people as David Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, Shimon Peres, and Yitzak Rabin himself. Amongst the Israeli leadership, there are no clean hands.
– Finally, Dror Moreh repeatedly pushes another message: “a central theme of the documentary is the idea that Israel has incredible tactics, but it lacks long-term strategy…if [security] operations do not support a move toward a peace settlement, then they are meaningless.”
Again, this erroneous assessment is a function of being so deeply situated inside of a problem that you cannot perceive it clearly. Moreh assumes that achieving peace with the Palestinians is the only “long-term strategy” Israel ought to have and, in its absence, Israel pursues no strategy at all. However, an objective assessment of Israeli history tells us that there has been another strategy in place. The Zionist leaders have in fact always had a long-term strategy to avoid any meaningful peace settlement, so as to allow: 1. occupation of all “Eretz Israel,” 2. the ethnic cleansing or cantonization of the native population, and 3. settlement of the cleansed territory with Jews.
It is because of this same naivete that Moreh confesses himself “shocked” when Shalom compares the occupation of the Palestinian territories to “Germany’s occupation of Europe” which, of course, had its own goal of ethnic cleansing. It is to Shalom’s credit that he made the statement on camera, and to Morah’s credit that he kept the statement in the final version of the film. But then Morah spoils this act of bravery when he tells Amanpour, “Only Jews can say these kind of words. And only they can have the justification to speak as they spoke in the film.” Well, I can think of one other group who has every right to make the same comparison Shalom makes– the Palestinians.
Part III — The Retired Official’s Confession Syndrome

For all its shortcomings, the film is a step forward in the on-going effort to deny the idealized Zionist storyline a monopoly in the West. Indeed, that The Gatekeepers was made at all, and was received so positively at major film venues, is a sign that this wholly skewed Israeli storyline is finally breaking down. Certainly, this deconstruction still has a long way to go, but the process is picking up speed.

On the other hand there is something troubling about the belated nature of the insights given in these interviews. They are examples of what I like to call the “retired official’s confession syndrome.” Quite often those who, in retirement, make these sorts of confessions were well aware of the muddled or murderous situation while in office. But, apparently, they lacked the courage to publicize it at the time. It would have meant risking their careers, their popularity, and perhaps relations with their friends and family. One is reminded of the fate of Professor Ilan Pappe, who did stand up and live his principles, and eventually lost his position at Haifa University and was, in the end, forced into exile. For most, however, including these leaders of the Shin Bet, their understanding was clouded and their actions skewed by a time-honored, but deeply flawed, notion of “duty” to carry on like good soldiers.

Part IV – Conclusion

To date, Israel’s leaders and Zionist supporters have shown an amazing capacity to ignore all criticism. The newly re-elected Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has let it be known that he has no intention of watching The Gatekeepers. It is also questionable how many of those who voted for him, or other right-wing politicians, will bother to seek the documentary out.

Israel’s government has recently made the decision to ignore the country’s obligations under the United Nations Human Rights Charter, a decision signaled by its representatives refusal to show up for the country’s “universal periodic review” before the Human Rights Council. Nor is there any sign that any new right-wing led government coalition will stop the ethnic cleansing and illegal colonial repopulation of East Jerusalem.

The only reasonable conclusion one can come to is that it will take increasing outside pressure on Israel, in the form of boycotts, divestment and sanctions, to convince a sufficient number of that country’s Jewish population that they must change their ways. To not change is to acquiesce in Israel’s evolving status as a pariah state. The irony of it all is that that status will have little to do with their being Jewish. Yet, It will have everything to do with the fact that, in this day and age, even the Jews have no right to maintain a racist state.

Of Hope and Disgust: Solitary Confinement

By William Fisher

This news may come a tad late for Nicholas James Yarris, and may be greeted with a combination of hope and disgust. Hope that things are going to get better. Disgust that it’s taken a generation to take the first step.

What is this big news?

Dick Durbin, the second-highest-ranking Democrat in the U.S. Senate, announced that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has agreed to a comprehensive review of the use of solitary confinement in its prisons.

The study will include the fiscal and public safety consequences of the controversial practice and will be carried out by the National Institute of Corrections (NIC). NIC plans to retain an independent auditor to examine the use of solitary confinement, which is also known as restrictive housing. NIC is an agency within the Federal Bureau of Prisons, effectively controlled by appointments by Attorney General Eric Holder.

BOP spokesman Chris Burke said, "We are confident that the audit will yield valuable information to improve our operations, and we thank Senator Durbin for his continued interest in this very important topic."

Prisoners in isolation are often confined to small cells without windows for up to 23 hours a day. Durbin's office said the practice can have a severe psychological impact on inmates and that more than half of all suicides committed in prisons occur in solitary confinement.

In Durbin's state of Illinois, 56 percent of inmates have spent some time in segregated housing. Illinois houses TAMMS, the state’s supermax facility in Tamms, Illinois, where it has been reported by numerous journalists, penologists, and academics, that solitary confinement is routinely being used as a management tool. Durbin and other State leaders have been campaigning to close the facility because of its high cost.

"The United States holds more prisoners in solitary confinement than any other democratic nation in the world, and the dramatic expansion of solitary confinement is a human rights issue we can't ignore," said Durbin, who chaired a Senate hearing on the use of solitary confinement last year. It was the very first such hearing ever held in Congress.

And it is a subject about which Nicholas James Yarris knows a little something. He spent 23 years in solitary confinement as a death row prisoner in Pennsylvania before his exoneration through DNA testing in 2003. The Innocence Project was instrumental in securing his release.

Here’s what Yarris said:

Having spent an astounding 8000-plus days locked within a cell 23 hours a day, I have witnessed or understood every form of deprivation or sensory starved confinement one can know.

There are two features to solitary confinement that I wish to address here in this statement.

First, the most degrading mental breakdown to men comes from the physical confinement. In the three decades I spent watching new prisoners come to death row in Pennsylvania, I saw with little variation, the breakdown of the personality of men initially entering death row. This occurs when all structure from your previous life hits full stop and you are left with ordered times for every facet of your care.

Combined with intentional cruelty inflicted upon men in maximum-security settings, makes most men break down in their first two years. I entered death row at age 21, being the second youngest man on death row in my home state at the time in 1982.

In subsequent years, I saw death row swell in numbers from 24 in 1982, to 250 in 2004 by the time I was set free. I saw endless processions of men enter death row only to see that within two years each one either committed violence on others, self harmed or had serious mental breakdowns and required long-term medications to keep them stable.

Of the three men executed by Pennsylvania, two were heavily medicated psychiatric patients with long-term mental health issues.

I have witnessed numerous suicide attempts and 11 successful suicides. I myself have not only attempted my own suicide at age 21, but later in my incarceration, in 2002, I asked to be executed rather than to continue being held in endless degradation..

It was only because of my asking to be executed that the DNA tests I sought for 15 years had been forced upon the state. I was not let out of solitary confinement until the day I was set free. I was exonerated by DNA in July of 2003 and was not released until January 2004. In the last months I was stripped of all death row privileges and was placed in an administrative/disciplinary housing unit where I was allowed nothing at all in my cell.

I was brought before the prison administration of Green County Prison in Pennsylvania once DNA had been used in court to remove all of my death row convictions. I was told that I posed a threat to the staff because in the years confined within solitary confinement, having my hand crushed by a guard or other things done to me made them fear me. I was told that they feared I would lash out at them because they could not accept that anyone.

For all of Pennsylvania's efforts to hold me in solitary confinement because I was so dangerous was, in the end, a facade. I make this last point not to be facetious, but to point out the reality that every prisoner at some point is going to get out, either on his feet or not. I am able to look at what was done to me and see beyond the draw of anger or pain. Not everyone is going to feel as I do, and they are going to be worse in society than they were before we subjected them to solitary confinement.

I wonder just how much arm-twisting Dick Durbin had to engage in to get the prison bureau to agree to this study. But Durbin’s reputation is that, when he has the sniff of his target in his nostrils, he can be short, sharp and unforgiving.

That this study might actually get started and finished is good news. But taking a generation to reach the start-point should trigger a healthy dose of skepticism. From testimony given at Durbin’s Senate hearing, we get a strong sense that solitary confinement is not a top priority for the current head of the prisons bureau, Charles Samuels. At the hearing, he was unable to tell the senators how many inmates were currently in solitary in the Federal prison system. While Samuels offered no figures for the total number of prisoners the BOP holds in isolation, in 2010 a BOP spokesperson told CNN that there were more than 11,000 inmates in "special housing"—a common euphemism—out of a total prison population, at that time, of about 210,000, it was reported by Mother Jones. Since that time, the prison population has continued to grow.

Samuels says solitary is “a deterrent and it works," before admitting his agency has never studied the issue. Yet the federal prison system is a serious offender when it comes to the use and abuse of solitary.

MOJO went on to write, “A former corrections officer who rose through the ranks at the BOP, Samuels came off as a consummate bureaucrat. (His predecessor Harley Lappin, forced to resign after a drunk driving incident, now works for the nation's largest private-prison corporation.)

Samuels quickly made his position clear: "Segregated housing," as he called it, is a necessary part of prison practice, and is not used excessively in the federal system. It's not a "preferred option," Samuels said, but he went on to say he believes that it helps stop violence and other bad behavior in prison.

Human Rights Watch and other rights groups have completed a number of major studies of prisoners and detainees in many local, state and federal facilities, including those run by private contractors. Their conclusion is that inmates “confront conditions that are abusive, degrading and dangerous. Soaring prison populations due to harsh sentencing laws—which legislators have been reluctant to change—and immigrant detention policies coupled with tight budgets have left governments unwilling to make the investments in staff and resources necessary to ensure safe and humane conditions of confinement. Such failures violate the human rights of all persons deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

David Fathi, the Director of the ACLU’s National Prison Project, said, " The [BOP] is the nation’s largest prison system with over 215,000 prisoners, and has been using solitary confinement at an alarmingly high rate. Similar reviews in state prison systems have led to dramatic reductions in solitary confinement, generating millions of dollars in taxpayer savings. We hope and expect that the review announced today will lead the Bureau to significantly curtail its use of this draconian, inhumane, and expensive practice."

And lest any of us get carried away with enthusiasm, it would be prudent to remember that our nation’s capitol is suffocating under the weight of hundreds of thousands of reports on every conceivable subject – which no one has read or, Heaven Forfend, acted on since they were published.

Pleading With Satan

By William Fisher

President Obama is fond of waxing eloquent about “the majesty of the rule of law.” A prosecutor reminds us that we’re the only country in the world where a defendant’s innocence is defended with at least as much passion as his guilt is attacked. A judge rolls out all his Sunday adjectives to extol the blessings of the jury system.

This is, of course, rhetoric, and talk is cheap. Bottom Line: It’s not true. Or it’s only partly true. Or it’s true only a tiny fraction of the time. Whatever.

But when I hear pronouncements like these, I am invariably reminded of some of the tawdry practices that threaten to shatter our criminal justice system.

Tim Lynch, who runs the Cato Institute’s Criminal Justice portfolio, has written an article he calls “The Devil's Bargain: How Plea Agreements, Never Contemplated by the Framers, Undermine Justice.” The article appeared in the July 2011 issue of Reason.

Lynch writes that the point of the article is that” most Americans are under the mistaken impression that when the government accuses someone of a crime, the case typically proceeds to trial, where a jury of laypeople hears arguments from the prosecution and the defense, then deliberates over the evidence before deciding on the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”
Well, according to Tim Lynch, me, and just about everyone associated with the criminal justice system except prosecutors and bookkeepers, this image of American justice is “wildly off the mark,” as Tim puts it.

He says, “Criminal cases rarely go to trial, because about 95 percent are resolved by plea bargains. In a plea bargain, the prosecutor usually offers a reduced prison sentence if the

defendant agrees to waive his right to a jury trial and admit guilt in a summary proceeding before a judge.”

This procedure was not contemplated by the Framers. The Constitution simply says, “the Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury.”

So it’s not as if one of our storied forefathers corralled his colleagues and said, Hey, Colleagues, let’s come up with a system that’s better and cheaper than juries and would also relieve any doubt about guilt or innocence and, that “would replace jury trials with a supposedly superior system of charge-and-sentence bargaining,” as Tim Lynch puts it.
Tim Lynch likens the growth of the plea deal to the growth of government in general. “Plea bargaining slowly crept into and eventually grew to dominate the system,” he says..

He goes on: “From the government’s perspective, plea bargaining has two advantages. First, its less expensive and time-consuming than jury trials, which means prosecutors can haul more people into court and legislators can add more offenses to the criminal code.

“Second, by cutting the jury out of the picture, prosecutors and judges acquire more influence over case outcomes.’ Once a defendant pleads guilty as part of a plea deal, he’s guilty. No one has to sweat it out while the Law and Order-type jury comes to its decision.”

Supporters of plea deals also point out that a plea agreement, requiring only the approval of the judge, saves the court endless hours of litigation.

From a defendant’s perspective, writes Tim Lynch, “plea bargaining extorts guilty pleas. People who have never been prosecuted may think there is no way they would plead guilty to a crime they did not commit. But when the government has a ‘witness’ who is willing to lie, and your own attorney urges you to accept one year in prison rather than risk a ten-year jury sentence, the decision becomes harder.”

But not always. To begin with, what if the defendants are innocent? Such things have been known to happen with frequency in courtrooms all across the county. In this situation, innocent people are getting locked up for crimes they did not commit.

And sometimes the choice of plea or no plea seems like no choice at all. Four men from upstate New York were arrested for “material support of terrorism” a few years ago. The prosecutor’s deal was “confess or you will find yourself in Guantanamo Bay forever.” The four confessed and are serving time in the US.
Or how about a plea when the defendants are guilty? Why should guilty men get reduced sentences when they know they’re guilty. The answer is: Because they Can.
By signing on with the DA, the guilty party absolves him/herself of guilt for the crime he was to be charged with (more serious) and accepts the one he’s plead to (less serious). Which could mean the criminal would be out on the street and doing what he does while those charged with the original crime are still serving their time.

Why has this happened? There are a number of reasons but the primary one is cost. The costs of preparing a case, empanelling a jury, and conducting an average trial, tends to vary somewhat depending on location, complexity, time required, and other factors. But a recent Wyoming murder trial believed to be at the low end of the cost scale cost $111,000.

Later, if the defendant is found guilty, it will cost $55.09 on average per day or $20,108 per year to keep an inmate in prison (FY0708),

The impact on the courts’ caseloads is immediate. The 1,195 jury trials conducted in 2011 are one-third the number held in 1996, according to the Texas Administrative Office of Courts. During the same period, the number of lawsuits filed rose 25 percent. In 1996, juries decided one out of every 48 lawsuits filed. Last year, only one in 183 new complaints.

Says Houston trial lawyer David Beck, “We are seeing our rights to trial by jury disappear before our eyes.” To which many other lawyers, judges and defendants argue that justice should never be held hostage to the mountain of unprocessed paper work that might one day become the organized basis of a real jury trial.
Someone – a lot of someones – ought to be reminding our President that justice is not simply a cost-benefit analysis. Some of our sentencing rules may well be demented, but we do have rules. They should be changed, then followed.