By William Fisher
There was a time, not too long ago, when the Presidential Medal of Freedom really meant something. That was when its recipients included such genuine American heroes as George Kennan, Dean Acheson, Felix Frankfurter, Hubert Humphrey and John F. Kennedy.
That time come will come to an end next week, when President Bush confers the nation’s highest civilian honor on former CIA chief George Tenet, Iraq Viceroy L. Paul Bremer III, and General Tommy Franks, who led the US invasion of Iraq.
Can we not be forgiven for being just a tad cynical about these three recipients? After all, it was George Tenet who told the president that finding WMD in Iraq would be a slam-dunk, and is generally believed to have been pushed out of office. It was General Franks who gave us Mr. Bush on the aircraft carrier trumpeting, “mission accomplished”. And it was Ambassador Bremer who allowed the unchecked looting of Baghdad, dissolved the Iraqi Army, and was father to a host of other uninformed decisions that opened the way for the current insurgency.
But, hey, maybe a medal is not too high a price to pay to reward Gen. Franks for campaigning for the president, or for the silence of Mr. Tenet and Ambassador Bremer, whose greatly anticipated kiss and tell books might just prove an embarrassment for the Administration.
We all know how Mr. Bush feels about loyalty. Didn’t he just reward it by giving the Secretary of State job to a National Security Advisor who greatest skills appear to be piano playing, ignoring the advice of counter-terrorism experts like Richard Clarke, and telling the boss what he wants to hear? By extending the tenure of a Secretary of Defense who has consistently used his charisma and charm to paper over the huge cracks in our military establishment? By nominating as his new Attorney General a lawyer who finds the Geneva Conventions obsolete and ‘quaint’?
George Tenet will receive his Medal of Freedom even as his successor burns the midnight oil to tear up his old and dysfunctional agency. Ambassador Bremer may have been passed over for the Secretary of State slot, but will get his medal nonetheless –and only a few weeks after he started his campaign to blame others for our shortcomings in Iraq, and then was coaxed to quickly retract his ‘off the record’ comments about our not having enough troops to get the job done.
Not to misunderstand. Paul Bremer, Tommy Franks and George Tenet are good people who did their best.
But the Presidential Medal of Freedom? When Harry Truman established the award in 1945, it was to recognize ‘exceptional meritorious service’ in the war. When President Kennedy reintroduced it in 1963, it was to be an honor "for especially meritorious contribution to the security or national interests of the United States, or world peace, or cultural or other significant public or private endeavors".
There may be just a few people who have trouble seeing these three recipients as having contributed much to world peace, national security or “cultural or other significant public or private endeavors".
Think about it.
Monday, December 06, 2004
What is Putin up to?
The article below is from an email from Sharon Tennison, President of the Center for Citizen Initiatives, an American NGO that conducts programs to assist Russian entrepreneurs. She wrote this from St. Petersburg.
The big questions in all Russia watcher's minds these days are,
"What is Putin up to?", "Is Putin really an authoritarian who is
turning Russia back to totalitarianism?", "What are we to make of
Putin's recent decisions?"
I've just returned from Moscow, where I had the most interesting and
most high-level group of meetings ever. It happened mainly because I
was able to get in touch with some specialists in Moscow who have
grown in prominence since I was last in contact with them.
In any case, this fact conspired to allow me interviews with several
well-known Russians who, to my surprise, have had recent meetings
with Vladimir Putin concerning Russia's economy, media, corruption
and the reforms. None of them are in the government; all could be
said to be "informal advisors" or at least respected by Putin for
their specific expertise. They don't consider themselves supporters
or non-supporters of Putin - rather independent thinkers and
analysts. None had had discussions regarding the Ukraine events
since these exploded after the last time they met with Putin.
I won't mention names since for the most part they are my friends,
but rather I will try to give a short summary of discussions with
them regarding their take on the situation in the Kremlin and Putin's
recent decision making. First, they are honest people and
specialists, given to deep and penetrating analysis, not cover-ups or
sensationalism. I didn't mention any of my discussions with other
appointments to them. To my knowledge none of them know each other
well, if at all, but certainly by name. All believe instinctively
in democratic principles and healthy globalism.
The general picture they give is that Putin is in an extremely
precarious place now, even though he still enjoys phenomenal
popularity with the masses despite the beginnings of his social
reforms; that his experience in Germany and his ability to speak
German fluently (therefore understanding European culture and
thinking) deeply impacted his basic concepts regarding democracy and
free markets; that without doubt Putin is still a reformer at heart;
but the challenge is "how" to make it work in Russia, a nation of
endemic corrupt practices and citizens with little to no experience
with democratic principles and institutions. This includes everyone
in the chain of power from local district heads, to regional
governors, up to and including the State Duma.
Russian specialists in Moscow think tanks have, as it turns out,
pondered these governance issues, some for 25 years. One said that
in 1971, they and their institute looked at all the nation's
parameters and knew that the USSR was economically doomed. They began
studying the experience of other nations for conversion to a
different form of government by making exploratory trips to other
countries which had stepped from a centralized top-down economy to a
free market economy; e.g. Chile and others. It wasn't until the 80s
that Putin was put in Germany where he observed daily, the pluses and
minuses of closed and open societies. But the average Soviet on the
street was still immersed in communism and felt it would last forever
- while top leadership carried on as long as they could with blinders
in place. Gorbachev finally began to tear the blinders off.
Putin's current choices and dilemma as explained to me: In
his first term, he had to clean out as much of the Yeltsin influence
as possible. Putin appointed to chief posts, lawyers he knew
personally, perhaps thinking they could be trusted and would be the
brightest and best able to deal with legislative changes. However,
it was pointed out to me that Russian lawyers aren't known for
creative thinking, that for the most part they think "in the box"
and Putin's choices have been no different. He has been disappointed
with their thinking and actions and at present is using them less and
depending more on his own instincts. No president can afford to do
this for long, given that one person's instincts for a whole nation
cannot produce reliable decision making. This situation is of deep,
deep concern for those with whom I spoke.
I would also add an all-important point to my mind and that is: Putin
came to office in his first term without a constituency... unlike
presidents of other countries who are swept in by hoards of bright
and not so bright people. Putin had no party which elected him;
indeed, he had to get rid of the prevailing power that brought him to
the presidency - the oligarchs who ran the Kremlin under Yeltsin.
That he was able to wrench their hands from the steering wheel of
the state and personally survive, was a feat that I and others didn't
believe he could accomplish. For the most part, he has succeeded and
is still alive - something of a miracle since these super rich are
reported to have been involved with contract killings, etc.
So Putin had no built-in support system when he came to power, no
wide knowledge of who to select for the many posts which required new
heads during his four years. He's been ridiculed for stacking
Russia's appointee seats with University friends from StPetersburg
and former members of the KGB with whom he had worked. While not
wise, what would any do in similar predicament? We would most likely
choose those we knew and thought we could trust. As for the old
guard in Russia, there were precious few, if any, who he could trust.
None of those I spoke with last week think Putin is personally "power
hungry." It seemed to them a ridiculous question to ask and was
brushed off. They believe he wants the best for Russia and that he
wants Russia to be integrated into the world of free nations. None
believe that he wants a return to rank authoritarianism. All believe
he is in a harrowing spot trying to figure out "how" to get from
where the nation is today to where it needs to go, but not knowing
the means to get there, whom to trust to help - and is working in
near isolation at this juncture. This is both tragic for him and
dangerous for Russia.
I'd like to add another personal comment which to my mind complicates
Putin's task as president and that is the behaviors and practices of
Russia's citizenry. We assume that Russian and Western citizens are
alike, that we think alike, that we reason alike. For the most part
we do. On the educational and intellectual end, Russians in general
surpass Americans educationally and in classical culture. However,
there is one small but very decisive aspect of their public and
collective experience which has a near void.
This includes the very crux of what it takes to create a civil
society: a near void in the impulse of citizens to unite, the
willingness to stand up publicly for change; the inclination to
challenge authorities; the stomach to run for public office to change
things; the willingness to take on informal leadership; the
experience to organize and facilitate effective ad hoc meetings; the
ability to lead or to accept leadership from each other; the capacity
to trust one another. This void is understandable; they have had no
practice, no models in these spheres. For three generations, even
centuries, any of these attempts were punished by imprisonment and
even death. However, in combination, they vastly complicate Russia's
ability today to move toward democratic behaviors and institutions,
and local self governance. Any country's executive leadership needs
a viable, strong collective voice from the bottom up to inform and
balance executive power. There is a Russian proverb that says
something like, the Tsar who doesn't listen to boyars is damned...
The question of freedom of the media comes up here, and yet it is
more than that. People uniting creates voice, developing and
lobbying societal needs, business needs, gets attention. This void
must be filled by Russian citizens themselves.
Hopefully the current experience of assertiveness by citizens in
Ukraine, whether Russians agree with Ukrainians goals or not, will
provide Russians with a model and embolden them to see what can
happen when citizens unite and stand for what they believe they
deserve.
One important aspect to acknowledge: Russians who have developed
businesses, those who help facilitate the building of business
sectors (like CCI offices across Russia's regions), and those who
have had out-of-country experience, tend to have much better
understanding of what's needed to develop civil society and have a
readiness to stand up and be counted, than do those who haven't had
this combination of experiences.
Thanks to all of you who have hosted Russian entrepreneurs in your
businesses, homes and communities where they have been able to fill
in the blanks left by their near unique history - which they aren't
responsible for - but nonetheless needs to be replaced by a more
open, assertive society if Russia moves to its rightful place in the
21st century. Thanks also to the Department of State which has
helped fund PEP and other CCI programs and recently has worked
diligently to help CCI move the PEP program into perpetuity.
I'm told that Putin is currently putting together a "public
chamber" to try to stimulate innovative thinking and input from
high-level professionals across Russia, thus providing additional
brain power at the top. It is said that the chamber will be composed
of volunteer specialists with no remuneration, cars, dachas or
privileges. They will have revolving term limits.
The big questions in all Russia watcher's minds these days are,
"What is Putin up to?", "Is Putin really an authoritarian who is
turning Russia back to totalitarianism?", "What are we to make of
Putin's recent decisions?"
I've just returned from Moscow, where I had the most interesting and
most high-level group of meetings ever. It happened mainly because I
was able to get in touch with some specialists in Moscow who have
grown in prominence since I was last in contact with them.
In any case, this fact conspired to allow me interviews with several
well-known Russians who, to my surprise, have had recent meetings
with Vladimir Putin concerning Russia's economy, media, corruption
and the reforms. None of them are in the government; all could be
said to be "informal advisors" or at least respected by Putin for
their specific expertise. They don't consider themselves supporters
or non-supporters of Putin - rather independent thinkers and
analysts. None had had discussions regarding the Ukraine events
since these exploded after the last time they met with Putin.
I won't mention names since for the most part they are my friends,
but rather I will try to give a short summary of discussions with
them regarding their take on the situation in the Kremlin and Putin's
recent decision making. First, they are honest people and
specialists, given to deep and penetrating analysis, not cover-ups or
sensationalism. I didn't mention any of my discussions with other
appointments to them. To my knowledge none of them know each other
well, if at all, but certainly by name. All believe instinctively
in democratic principles and healthy globalism.
The general picture they give is that Putin is in an extremely
precarious place now, even though he still enjoys phenomenal
popularity with the masses despite the beginnings of his social
reforms; that his experience in Germany and his ability to speak
German fluently (therefore understanding European culture and
thinking) deeply impacted his basic concepts regarding democracy and
free markets; that without doubt Putin is still a reformer at heart;
but the challenge is "how" to make it work in Russia, a nation of
endemic corrupt practices and citizens with little to no experience
with democratic principles and institutions. This includes everyone
in the chain of power from local district heads, to regional
governors, up to and including the State Duma.
Russian specialists in Moscow think tanks have, as it turns out,
pondered these governance issues, some for 25 years. One said that
in 1971, they and their institute looked at all the nation's
parameters and knew that the USSR was economically doomed. They began
studying the experience of other nations for conversion to a
different form of government by making exploratory trips to other
countries which had stepped from a centralized top-down economy to a
free market economy; e.g. Chile and others. It wasn't until the 80s
that Putin was put in Germany where he observed daily, the pluses and
minuses of closed and open societies. But the average Soviet on the
street was still immersed in communism and felt it would last forever
- while top leadership carried on as long as they could with blinders
in place. Gorbachev finally began to tear the blinders off.
Putin's current choices and dilemma as explained to me: In
his first term, he had to clean out as much of the Yeltsin influence
as possible. Putin appointed to chief posts, lawyers he knew
personally, perhaps thinking they could be trusted and would be the
brightest and best able to deal with legislative changes. However,
it was pointed out to me that Russian lawyers aren't known for
creative thinking, that for the most part they think "in the box"
and Putin's choices have been no different. He has been disappointed
with their thinking and actions and at present is using them less and
depending more on his own instincts. No president can afford to do
this for long, given that one person's instincts for a whole nation
cannot produce reliable decision making. This situation is of deep,
deep concern for those with whom I spoke.
I would also add an all-important point to my mind and that is: Putin
came to office in his first term without a constituency... unlike
presidents of other countries who are swept in by hoards of bright
and not so bright people. Putin had no party which elected him;
indeed, he had to get rid of the prevailing power that brought him to
the presidency - the oligarchs who ran the Kremlin under Yeltsin.
That he was able to wrench their hands from the steering wheel of
the state and personally survive, was a feat that I and others didn't
believe he could accomplish. For the most part, he has succeeded and
is still alive - something of a miracle since these super rich are
reported to have been involved with contract killings, etc.
So Putin had no built-in support system when he came to power, no
wide knowledge of who to select for the many posts which required new
heads during his four years. He's been ridiculed for stacking
Russia's appointee seats with University friends from StPetersburg
and former members of the KGB with whom he had worked. While not
wise, what would any do in similar predicament? We would most likely
choose those we knew and thought we could trust. As for the old
guard in Russia, there were precious few, if any, who he could trust.
None of those I spoke with last week think Putin is personally "power
hungry." It seemed to them a ridiculous question to ask and was
brushed off. They believe he wants the best for Russia and that he
wants Russia to be integrated into the world of free nations. None
believe that he wants a return to rank authoritarianism. All believe
he is in a harrowing spot trying to figure out "how" to get from
where the nation is today to where it needs to go, but not knowing
the means to get there, whom to trust to help - and is working in
near isolation at this juncture. This is both tragic for him and
dangerous for Russia.
I'd like to add another personal comment which to my mind complicates
Putin's task as president and that is the behaviors and practices of
Russia's citizenry. We assume that Russian and Western citizens are
alike, that we think alike, that we reason alike. For the most part
we do. On the educational and intellectual end, Russians in general
surpass Americans educationally and in classical culture. However,
there is one small but very decisive aspect of their public and
collective experience which has a near void.
This includes the very crux of what it takes to create a civil
society: a near void in the impulse of citizens to unite, the
willingness to stand up publicly for change; the inclination to
challenge authorities; the stomach to run for public office to change
things; the willingness to take on informal leadership; the
experience to organize and facilitate effective ad hoc meetings; the
ability to lead or to accept leadership from each other; the capacity
to trust one another. This void is understandable; they have had no
practice, no models in these spheres. For three generations, even
centuries, any of these attempts were punished by imprisonment and
even death. However, in combination, they vastly complicate Russia's
ability today to move toward democratic behaviors and institutions,
and local self governance. Any country's executive leadership needs
a viable, strong collective voice from the bottom up to inform and
balance executive power. There is a Russian proverb that says
something like, the Tsar who doesn't listen to boyars is damned...
The question of freedom of the media comes up here, and yet it is
more than that. People uniting creates voice, developing and
lobbying societal needs, business needs, gets attention. This void
must be filled by Russian citizens themselves.
Hopefully the current experience of assertiveness by citizens in
Ukraine, whether Russians agree with Ukrainians goals or not, will
provide Russians with a model and embolden them to see what can
happen when citizens unite and stand for what they believe they
deserve.
One important aspect to acknowledge: Russians who have developed
businesses, those who help facilitate the building of business
sectors (like CCI offices across Russia's regions), and those who
have had out-of-country experience, tend to have much better
understanding of what's needed to develop civil society and have a
readiness to stand up and be counted, than do those who haven't had
this combination of experiences.
Thanks to all of you who have hosted Russian entrepreneurs in your
businesses, homes and communities where they have been able to fill
in the blanks left by their near unique history - which they aren't
responsible for - but nonetheless needs to be replaced by a more
open, assertive society if Russia moves to its rightful place in the
21st century. Thanks also to the Department of State which has
helped fund PEP and other CCI programs and recently has worked
diligently to help CCI move the PEP program into perpetuity.
I'm told that Putin is currently putting together a "public
chamber" to try to stimulate innovative thinking and input from
high-level professionals across Russia, thus providing additional
brain power at the top. It is said that the chamber will be composed
of volunteer specialists with no remuneration, cars, dachas or
privileges. They will have revolving term limits.
Saturday, December 04, 2004
WORKING IN IRAQ
By William Fisher
Somewhere between Haliburton and CARE, there is a cadre of contractors in Iraq that is far less publicized, but just as vital to the country’s future. These are the consulting firms that help Iraqis create jobs by promoting entrepreneurism, improving agricultural and manufacturing efficiency, privatizing loss-making state-owned companies, building stronger private sector institutions, stimulating investment, developing information technology skills, and encouraging an independent judiciary and greater transparency in business and government.
The US government – principally the US Agency for International Development (USAID) -- is currently spending some $ 3.3 billion annually on contracts with these kinds of firms and their expert consultants. But these men and women are finding it increasingly frustrating to get anything done.
Their problem – like that of everyone else in Iraq -- is security. They are spending some 25-30 percent of their contract revenues hiring armored cars and small private armies. But even then they are constantly at risk, often unable to move around the country to work with the people they have been hired to help, and frequently forced to leave Iraq for periods for the relative safety of Jordan or Kuwait.
“I think it is almost impossible to do good work there right now, but the optimist in me hopes that will change”, said a senior executive for one contracting firm. Said another: “There is really very little getting done in Iraq these days, for obvious reasons.” Like almost all the firms contacted for this article, they spoke on condition on anonymity.
One contractor described her company’s elaborate security set-up. “We had to hire a militia, 80 Kurdish pesh merghas, to protect us. These are mountain fighters from the north of Iraq who were trained by US and British paramilitary during the time of the sanctions. Each fighter has an AK-47, many of them have pistols, grenades, and RPGs, and none of them would hesitate to use their weapons.”
But the “rules of engagement” have changed as the insurrection became more intense. Says the head of one program, “In April, when the Mehdi Brigade revolted in the south and overran some compounds of American contractors, we told our fighters that if a mob threatened the compound they should shoot to maim, wound people as necessary, but do not kill. Now, the situation is quite different, and our fighters will shoot to kill.”
Getting around has also become a far more serious problem – limiting the consultants’ opportunities to work with their Iraqi clients “When I go outside the compound in Baghdad”, says one consultant, “I have two cars and eight guards, all heavily armed. The cars are low profile. I sit in the back in the middle, squeezed in between two guards, and in the front seat are a driver and guard. The second car, filled with guards, follows directly behind my car. This is what Mrs. Hassan of CARE did not have. Her lightly or unarmed guard and driver could not overpower the people who abducted her. We have known for some time that women are considered high value targets for kidnapping, and it is a shame she did not assume that she was a potential target.” Margaret Hassan, a British-Iraqi who had worked in Iraq for thirty years, was kidnapped and murdered by insurgents last month.
Finding skilled consultants presents a mixed picture. Despite the considerable risks, some contractors are finding no shortage of Americans eager to work in Iraq, as well as many Iraqi experts. Most of them appear to like their work and many return for additional assignments. Other consulting firms tell IPS, “It has become very difficult to recruit skilled American consultants during these last few months. This does not negate the statement that there are many highly skilled consultants there, and that many of them return. But there is a greatly diminished number willing to go under current conditions.”
Asks one consultant rhetorically: “How I can possibly like my job?” There are days when I love it, and days when I am frustrated. It is compelling and the people are great. Every consultant I have had wants to return to Baghdad. Today, one of my good consultants returned with great delight for his fourth trip to Baghdad. And there are plenty of others like him, just as crazy as I am.”
But some consulting firms with experience in Iraq have declined to bid a second time as prime contractors, since prime contractors are responsible for costly security arrangements. One major consulting firm told IPS, “We have taken the position that in the long run we want to work in Iraq. But last May, as conditions started to deteriorate, we predicted they would continue to worsen. We were correct. Until security and operating conditions improve we will not be a prime bidder on any contract. And we will only bid as a subcontractor if we are relatively confident that the prime contractor has an effective security apparatus.”
Unlike these consulting organizations, many not-for-profit humanitarian aid groups have left Iraq. Tiziana Dearing, executive director of the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, wrote in the Boston Globe, “of the dozens of international [aid] organizations that entered Iraq in 2003, fewer than 10 remain. CARE withdrew its operations from Iraq earlier this month. The perception is fading that relief is independent, neutral, and exclusively for humanitarian ends.”
One of the major challenges facing consulting firms – and all those seen to be associated with the US-led coalition -- is the reality that the Iraqi economy is being restructured by what is widely perceived to be an occupying force, and with little input from Iraqi society.
Nevertheless, few consulting firms have left Iraq permanently and most say they are managing to get their work done, though usually far more slowly than they planned. Says one: “I know of no contractors who have left Iraq permanently. Some go to Amman for periods, others travel to Arbil in the Kurdish area, as we do. For the first time in a year we closed our Baghdad office last week, just before the Falluja assault, and placed our local staff on administrative leave. We work through email with staff from their homes, and even with the conflict going on now they are able to conduct a reduced level of business.”
Typical of the major projects being carried out by consulting firms is USAID’s $20 million Economic Governance contract with Bearing Point, Inc., a giant consulting firm headquartered in McLean, Virginia. Its mission is to develop and implement international economic practices aimed at improving economic governance in Iraq and developing a policy-enabling environment for private sector-led growth in the country. The three-year contract is expected to assist in reforming tax, fiscal and customs policies as well developing an IMF-acceptable monetary policy through building the capacity of Iraq's Central Bank.
USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios is aware of the difficulties of working in Iraq’s hostile environment, but points to solid achievements. He recently told Congress that “Iraqis are good businessmen, and economic activity is picking up significantly despite the violence. But jobs remain a vital issue.” He says USAID grants “have put more than 77,000 people to work on public programs.”
Natsios also points to achievements in commercial banking, commercial law, agricultural reconstruction and development, micro-credit, restoration of the country's wetlands, democracy and governance, and helping human rights organizations.
One major contractor acknowledges that “there indeed is a lot of good going on in Iraq, but the fact that I cannot go to Baghdad because I might get my head cut off by a Zarqawi terrorist is not made better because Texas A&M brought in 1000 pounds of wheat seed.”
Somewhere between Haliburton and CARE, there is a cadre of contractors in Iraq that is far less publicized, but just as vital to the country’s future. These are the consulting firms that help Iraqis create jobs by promoting entrepreneurism, improving agricultural and manufacturing efficiency, privatizing loss-making state-owned companies, building stronger private sector institutions, stimulating investment, developing information technology skills, and encouraging an independent judiciary and greater transparency in business and government.
The US government – principally the US Agency for International Development (USAID) -- is currently spending some $ 3.3 billion annually on contracts with these kinds of firms and their expert consultants. But these men and women are finding it increasingly frustrating to get anything done.
Their problem – like that of everyone else in Iraq -- is security. They are spending some 25-30 percent of their contract revenues hiring armored cars and small private armies. But even then they are constantly at risk, often unable to move around the country to work with the people they have been hired to help, and frequently forced to leave Iraq for periods for the relative safety of Jordan or Kuwait.
“I think it is almost impossible to do good work there right now, but the optimist in me hopes that will change”, said a senior executive for one contracting firm. Said another: “There is really very little getting done in Iraq these days, for obvious reasons.” Like almost all the firms contacted for this article, they spoke on condition on anonymity.
One contractor described her company’s elaborate security set-up. “We had to hire a militia, 80 Kurdish pesh merghas, to protect us. These are mountain fighters from the north of Iraq who were trained by US and British paramilitary during the time of the sanctions. Each fighter has an AK-47, many of them have pistols, grenades, and RPGs, and none of them would hesitate to use their weapons.”
But the “rules of engagement” have changed as the insurrection became more intense. Says the head of one program, “In April, when the Mehdi Brigade revolted in the south and overran some compounds of American contractors, we told our fighters that if a mob threatened the compound they should shoot to maim, wound people as necessary, but do not kill. Now, the situation is quite different, and our fighters will shoot to kill.”
Getting around has also become a far more serious problem – limiting the consultants’ opportunities to work with their Iraqi clients “When I go outside the compound in Baghdad”, says one consultant, “I have two cars and eight guards, all heavily armed. The cars are low profile. I sit in the back in the middle, squeezed in between two guards, and in the front seat are a driver and guard. The second car, filled with guards, follows directly behind my car. This is what Mrs. Hassan of CARE did not have. Her lightly or unarmed guard and driver could not overpower the people who abducted her. We have known for some time that women are considered high value targets for kidnapping, and it is a shame she did not assume that she was a potential target.” Margaret Hassan, a British-Iraqi who had worked in Iraq for thirty years, was kidnapped and murdered by insurgents last month.
Finding skilled consultants presents a mixed picture. Despite the considerable risks, some contractors are finding no shortage of Americans eager to work in Iraq, as well as many Iraqi experts. Most of them appear to like their work and many return for additional assignments. Other consulting firms tell IPS, “It has become very difficult to recruit skilled American consultants during these last few months. This does not negate the statement that there are many highly skilled consultants there, and that many of them return. But there is a greatly diminished number willing to go under current conditions.”
Asks one consultant rhetorically: “How I can possibly like my job?” There are days when I love it, and days when I am frustrated. It is compelling and the people are great. Every consultant I have had wants to return to Baghdad. Today, one of my good consultants returned with great delight for his fourth trip to Baghdad. And there are plenty of others like him, just as crazy as I am.”
But some consulting firms with experience in Iraq have declined to bid a second time as prime contractors, since prime contractors are responsible for costly security arrangements. One major consulting firm told IPS, “We have taken the position that in the long run we want to work in Iraq. But last May, as conditions started to deteriorate, we predicted they would continue to worsen. We were correct. Until security and operating conditions improve we will not be a prime bidder on any contract. And we will only bid as a subcontractor if we are relatively confident that the prime contractor has an effective security apparatus.”
Unlike these consulting organizations, many not-for-profit humanitarian aid groups have left Iraq. Tiziana Dearing, executive director of the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, wrote in the Boston Globe, “of the dozens of international [aid] organizations that entered Iraq in 2003, fewer than 10 remain. CARE withdrew its operations from Iraq earlier this month. The perception is fading that relief is independent, neutral, and exclusively for humanitarian ends.”
One of the major challenges facing consulting firms – and all those seen to be associated with the US-led coalition -- is the reality that the Iraqi economy is being restructured by what is widely perceived to be an occupying force, and with little input from Iraqi society.
Nevertheless, few consulting firms have left Iraq permanently and most say they are managing to get their work done, though usually far more slowly than they planned. Says one: “I know of no contractors who have left Iraq permanently. Some go to Amman for periods, others travel to Arbil in the Kurdish area, as we do. For the first time in a year we closed our Baghdad office last week, just before the Falluja assault, and placed our local staff on administrative leave. We work through email with staff from their homes, and even with the conflict going on now they are able to conduct a reduced level of business.”
Typical of the major projects being carried out by consulting firms is USAID’s $20 million Economic Governance contract with Bearing Point, Inc., a giant consulting firm headquartered in McLean, Virginia. Its mission is to develop and implement international economic practices aimed at improving economic governance in Iraq and developing a policy-enabling environment for private sector-led growth in the country. The three-year contract is expected to assist in reforming tax, fiscal and customs policies as well developing an IMF-acceptable monetary policy through building the capacity of Iraq's Central Bank.
USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios is aware of the difficulties of working in Iraq’s hostile environment, but points to solid achievements. He recently told Congress that “Iraqis are good businessmen, and economic activity is picking up significantly despite the violence. But jobs remain a vital issue.” He says USAID grants “have put more than 77,000 people to work on public programs.”
Natsios also points to achievements in commercial banking, commercial law, agricultural reconstruction and development, micro-credit, restoration of the country's wetlands, democracy and governance, and helping human rights organizations.
One major contractor acknowledges that “there indeed is a lot of good going on in Iraq, but the fact that I cannot go to Baghdad because I might get my head cut off by a Zarqawi terrorist is not made better because Texas A&M brought in 1000 pounds of wheat seed.”
Saturday, November 27, 2004
AMERICANS FIND ALTERNATE SOURCES OF INFORMATION
By William Fisher
To combat the Bush Administration’s penchant for secrecy, Americans interested in transparency in government have been forced to find new sources for information they once read in their daily newspapers. But thanks to a few dedicated individuals and not-for-profit organizations -- and the Internet -- such information is easier to come by than ever before.
Steven Aftergood, who conducts one of the most widely used ‘open government’ programs, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) “Project on Government Secrecy”, says:“The Bush Administration has taken secrecy to a new level. They have greatly increased the numbers and types of classified documents. They have made it far more difficult and time-consuming to obtain documents under the Freedom of Information Act. And they have imposed ‘gag rules’ on an ever-widening group of government employees.”
As a result, says Aftergood, the “variety of Internet-based sources has increased substantially during the Bush Administration”. And, says Aftergood, “Freedom of Information Act requests are on the rise, passing three million for the first time last year. What is behind all of these phenomena is a growing public appetite for official records. That is a healthy impulse that in a democracy should be respected and cultivated, not scorned.”
“Open Government’ websites provide a wide variety of information.
For example, at the website of George Washington University’s “National Security Archive” (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/), you can read CIA manuals from the 1960s and the 1980s specifying approved methods of prisoner abuse. Or one of the last major pieces of the puzzle explaining American and British roles in the August 1953 coup against Iranian Premier Mohammad Mossadeq. Or, just posted, the telephone conversations of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in which he berates high-level subordinates for their efforts in 1976 to restrain human rights abuses by military dictators in Chile and Argentina.
“OpenTheGovernment.org” is a new coalition of 33 organizations dedicated to combating unwarranted government secrecy and promoting freedom of information. (http://www.openthegovernment.org). Among recent postings: An evaluation by The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press on “the likely impact of Attorney General Nominee Alberto Gonzales on Press Freedoms and the Public's Right to Know." The Reporters Committee staff researched Mr. Gonzales' performance as a judge on the Texas Supreme Court from January 1999 to December 2000 and as White House counsel since January 2001.
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) “Project on Government Secrecy” (www.fas.org/). publishes “Secrecy News”. A recent disclosure: “Americans can now be obligated to comply with legally-binding regulations that are unknown to them, and that indeed they are forbidden to know.” As an example, the website reports the effort of a former conservative member of Congress to board a commercial airplane. “She was pulled aside by airline personnel for additional screening, including a pat-down search for weapons or unauthorized materials. She requested a copy of the regulation authorizing such pat-downs, and was told that she couldn’t see it.” Why? "Because we don't have to," said an official of the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA). "That is called 'sensitive security information.' She's not allowed to see it, nor is anyone else," he said. "She refused to go through additional screening [without seeing the regulation], and was not allowed to fly.”
“BushSecrecy.org.” sponsored by the highly respected “Public Citizen” organization, chronicles and documents the administration's obsession with secrecy, as well as steps being taken to fight it. The website provides a variety of links to up-to-date summaries of each of the administration's major secrecy initiatives, with additional links from those summaries to key documents, such as executive orders, congressional materials, judicial decisions, and legal briefs filed by both sides in the court battles raging over these issues.
A new “Coalition of Journalists for Open Government” has been established "to provide timely information on freedom of information issues and on what journalism organizations are doing to foster greater transparency in government." (http://www.cjog.net/) The Coalition’s website reports that “the Department of Homeland Security is requiring all of its 180,000 employees and others outside the federal government to sign binding non-disclosure agreements covering unclassified information. Breaking the agreement could mean loss of job, stiff fines and imprisonment.”
Like many of the ‘open government’ websites, the Coalition sends out a free email newsletter.
Some of the source sites charge for documents. One such is “InsideDefense.com”, for those interested in defense policy. It provides primary source documents gathered by a team of Pentagon reporters, and issues a free weekly publication, “The Insider”, to alert readers to new documents (http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/insider.asp).
The FAS government secrecy project recently provided a sampling of other sources. A few examples: The “Society of Environmental Journalists” publishes a “Watchdog TipSheet” on First Amendment issues of interest to environmental journalists. “GlobalSecurity.org” provides “bottomless resources on all aspects of national security policy, and then some.” “The Resource Shelf” provides news on all aspects of government information policy and links to valuable source documents. “The Memory Hole” collects and publishes elusive records and documents that have been withdrawn from the public domain. “Cryptome” offers a rich collection of new official and unofficial documents on security policy.
“Behind the Homefront” offers "a daily chronicle of news in homeland security and military operations affecting newsgathering, access to information and the public's right to know." The “Project on Government Oversight” performs independent investigations to promote openness and government accountability.
The “Electronic Privacy Information Center” offers declassified documents and insights on cryptography policy and privacy. The “Center for Democracy and Technology” addresses access to government information along with its main focus on civil liberties. “Freedominfo.org” offers news and resources for freedom of information advocates around the world. “Access Reports” provides news and expert analysis on freedom of information policy. The Nautilus Institute’s “Global Disclosure Project” specializes in nuclear weapons policy and strategy.
Some websites are maintained by individuals, usually associated with universities. For example, the “Guide to Declassified Documents and Archival Materials for U.S. Foreign Policy and World Politics” is the work of David N. Gibbs of the University of Arizona. It provides a road map to declassified foreign policy records. “FOI.net” provides resources on national and foreign freedom of information law from Prof. Alasdair Roberts of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.
Has the proliferation of ‘Open Government’ websites had an impact on Bush Administration policies? Says Aftergood: “Almost all of the recent statistical trends are negative, i.e. in the direction of greater secrecy. So it would probably be an exaggeration to say this work on challenging government secrecy has had much of an impact on the government during the current Administration. Between a secretive Administration and a compliant Congress, the environment for open government advocacy is simply not very hospitable. The real value of the work lies in the fact that it represents the creation of alternate channels for public access to government information. These efforts to provide new means of access are not exactly the solution to government secrecy, but they are a constructive response that leaves the public less vulnerable to official secrecy than it otherwise would be.”
Most other observers interested in open government agree that there is likely to be little change in the Bush Administration’s attitude toward fuller disclosure and predict that the number of alternative sources will continue to grow.
But even the continuing proliferation of new sources of information will not correct some of the problems arising from excessive government secrecy. For example, Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, says: "Basic information that is crucial to oversight of the government's new spy powers under the Patriot Act -- such as how it is using new powers to obtain personal records -- has been cloaked in secrecy, making it impossible to judge the effectiveness of these powers or their impact on civil liberties."
To combat the Bush Administration’s penchant for secrecy, Americans interested in transparency in government have been forced to find new sources for information they once read in their daily newspapers. But thanks to a few dedicated individuals and not-for-profit organizations -- and the Internet -- such information is easier to come by than ever before.
Steven Aftergood, who conducts one of the most widely used ‘open government’ programs, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) “Project on Government Secrecy”, says:“The Bush Administration has taken secrecy to a new level. They have greatly increased the numbers and types of classified documents. They have made it far more difficult and time-consuming to obtain documents under the Freedom of Information Act. And they have imposed ‘gag rules’ on an ever-widening group of government employees.”
As a result, says Aftergood, the “variety of Internet-based sources has increased substantially during the Bush Administration”. And, says Aftergood, “Freedom of Information Act requests are on the rise, passing three million for the first time last year. What is behind all of these phenomena is a growing public appetite for official records. That is a healthy impulse that in a democracy should be respected and cultivated, not scorned.”
“Open Government’ websites provide a wide variety of information.
For example, at the website of George Washington University’s “National Security Archive” (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/), you can read CIA manuals from the 1960s and the 1980s specifying approved methods of prisoner abuse. Or one of the last major pieces of the puzzle explaining American and British roles in the August 1953 coup against Iranian Premier Mohammad Mossadeq. Or, just posted, the telephone conversations of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in which he berates high-level subordinates for their efforts in 1976 to restrain human rights abuses by military dictators in Chile and Argentina.
“OpenTheGovernment.org” is a new coalition of 33 organizations dedicated to combating unwarranted government secrecy and promoting freedom of information. (http://www.openthegovernment.org). Among recent postings: An evaluation by The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press on “the likely impact of Attorney General Nominee Alberto Gonzales on Press Freedoms and the Public's Right to Know." The Reporters Committee staff researched Mr. Gonzales' performance as a judge on the Texas Supreme Court from January 1999 to December 2000 and as White House counsel since January 2001.
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) “Project on Government Secrecy” (www.fas.org/). publishes “Secrecy News”. A recent disclosure: “Americans can now be obligated to comply with legally-binding regulations that are unknown to them, and that indeed they are forbidden to know.” As an example, the website reports the effort of a former conservative member of Congress to board a commercial airplane. “She was pulled aside by airline personnel for additional screening, including a pat-down search for weapons or unauthorized materials. She requested a copy of the regulation authorizing such pat-downs, and was told that she couldn’t see it.” Why? "Because we don't have to," said an official of the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA). "That is called 'sensitive security information.' She's not allowed to see it, nor is anyone else," he said. "She refused to go through additional screening [without seeing the regulation], and was not allowed to fly.”
“BushSecrecy.org.” sponsored by the highly respected “Public Citizen” organization, chronicles and documents the administration's obsession with secrecy, as well as steps being taken to fight it. The website provides a variety of links to up-to-date summaries of each of the administration's major secrecy initiatives, with additional links from those summaries to key documents, such as executive orders, congressional materials, judicial decisions, and legal briefs filed by both sides in the court battles raging over these issues.
A new “Coalition of Journalists for Open Government” has been established "to provide timely information on freedom of information issues and on what journalism organizations are doing to foster greater transparency in government." (http://www.cjog.net/) The Coalition’s website reports that “the Department of Homeland Security is requiring all of its 180,000 employees and others outside the federal government to sign binding non-disclosure agreements covering unclassified information. Breaking the agreement could mean loss of job, stiff fines and imprisonment.”
Like many of the ‘open government’ websites, the Coalition sends out a free email newsletter.
Some of the source sites charge for documents. One such is “InsideDefense.com”, for those interested in defense policy. It provides primary source documents gathered by a team of Pentagon reporters, and issues a free weekly publication, “The Insider”, to alert readers to new documents (http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/insider.asp).
The FAS government secrecy project recently provided a sampling of other sources. A few examples: The “Society of Environmental Journalists” publishes a “Watchdog TipSheet” on First Amendment issues of interest to environmental journalists. “GlobalSecurity.org” provides “bottomless resources on all aspects of national security policy, and then some.” “The Resource Shelf” provides news on all aspects of government information policy and links to valuable source documents. “The Memory Hole” collects and publishes elusive records and documents that have been withdrawn from the public domain. “Cryptome” offers a rich collection of new official and unofficial documents on security policy.
“Behind the Homefront” offers "a daily chronicle of news in homeland security and military operations affecting newsgathering, access to information and the public's right to know." The “Project on Government Oversight” performs independent investigations to promote openness and government accountability.
The “Electronic Privacy Information Center” offers declassified documents and insights on cryptography policy and privacy. The “Center for Democracy and Technology” addresses access to government information along with its main focus on civil liberties. “Freedominfo.org” offers news and resources for freedom of information advocates around the world. “Access Reports” provides news and expert analysis on freedom of information policy. The Nautilus Institute’s “Global Disclosure Project” specializes in nuclear weapons policy and strategy.
Some websites are maintained by individuals, usually associated with universities. For example, the “Guide to Declassified Documents and Archival Materials for U.S. Foreign Policy and World Politics” is the work of David N. Gibbs of the University of Arizona. It provides a road map to declassified foreign policy records. “FOI.net” provides resources on national and foreign freedom of information law from Prof. Alasdair Roberts of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.
Has the proliferation of ‘Open Government’ websites had an impact on Bush Administration policies? Says Aftergood: “Almost all of the recent statistical trends are negative, i.e. in the direction of greater secrecy. So it would probably be an exaggeration to say this work on challenging government secrecy has had much of an impact on the government during the current Administration. Between a secretive Administration and a compliant Congress, the environment for open government advocacy is simply not very hospitable. The real value of the work lies in the fact that it represents the creation of alternate channels for public access to government information. These efforts to provide new means of access are not exactly the solution to government secrecy, but they are a constructive response that leaves the public less vulnerable to official secrecy than it otherwise would be.”
Most other observers interested in open government agree that there is likely to be little change in the Bush Administration’s attitude toward fuller disclosure and predict that the number of alternative sources will continue to grow.
But even the continuing proliferation of new sources of information will not correct some of the problems arising from excessive government secrecy. For example, Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, says: "Basic information that is crucial to oversight of the government's new spy powers under the Patriot Act -- such as how it is using new powers to obtain personal records -- has been cloaked in secrecy, making it impossible to judge the effectiveness of these powers or their impact on civil liberties."
WELCOME TO NEVERLAND!
By William Fisher
Here we have a website that even Howard Deaniacs would love – complete with candidates’ bios, interactive forums, online polls, message boards, and all the other paraphernalia needed to help voters participate in upcoming municipal elections. There’s only one catch: the site is for men only; women can’t vote or run for office.
Here we have an ophthalmologist named “Arab Woman of the Year” and the first woman pilot to be hired for the private fleet of a billionaire prince, and an innovative new stem cell technology that could potentially benefit millions of patients, thanks to a company founded by a woman doctor and her husband. But the ophthalmologist is forbidden from driving a car to the award ceremony, or the pilot to the airport – because women are barred from driving. And the stem cell research company is located in India.
Here we have a country where women are, however, not sleeping. They pushed hard for voting rights and candidacy – and lost. But at least one woman succeeded: She started an Internet magazine devoted to getting other women to participate in jihad.
Here we have a government promising reform, approving the first independent human rights organization in the country’s history, and organizing one of its own, and at the same time passing a law prohibiting public employees from talking to the news media, going on talk shows or making speeches criticizing government policies or programs.
Here we have a country whose government authorized the creation of a journalists’ association, and then fired a leading journalist who had been critical of the government.
Here we have a country that has imprisoned an American citizen for over a year without charge or access to legal counsel, reportedly at the request of the US, and which routinely rounds up human rights activists and ships them off to jail.
Here we have a country that gave us Osama Bin Laden and most of the 9/11 hijackers, a country whose billionaires have funneled millions to people who want to kill us, a country famous for its fanatical fundamentalist preachers, but now a country the United States hails as one of its staunchest allies in the ‘war on terror’.
No, this is not Neverland. It’s Saudi Arabia, a country caught between the dark ages and the twenty-first century. And ambivalent about which it likes best.
There is a one-word answer to ‘Why should we care?’ Oil. We have to care because without Saudi oil, the economies of the world would rapidly grind to a halt.
Many who claim to be Saudi ‘experts’ claim that ‘reform’ is happening in the Kingdom. They describe it as a ‘quiet revolution’. Perhaps. But the revolution is so quiet that none of the rest of us can hear a peep. And if there is change at all, its pace is beyond glacial.
A year ago, Saudi Arabia launched a new national advertising campaign in most of the top 25 U.S. media markets. Saudi officials said the ads were "designed to help broaden American perceptions of the country and demonstrate the Kingdom's steadfast commitment to fighting the War on Terrorism." The Saudi ambassador to the US was quoted as saying: "Despite all of the attention we have received, few people know what Saudi Arabia looks like or appreciate how far we have come in the last thirty years. Currently, there are big changes going on in Saudi Arabia. And we want Americans to know about them."
But Human Rights Watch (HRW), a leading advocacy group, said, “Without basic human rights reforms, Saudi Arabia's new media campaign in the United States will not change public opinion about the kingdom.”
The HRW statement declared, "Continuing restrictions on basic rights in Saudi Arabia are no secret. An expensive advertising and marketing blitz is no substitute for meaningful changes in how the government treats its citizens and its 5.5 million migrant workers.”
During a visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2003, senior Saudi government officials told an HRW delegation that reforms were on the way, including new procedures in the criminal justice system, restraints on 4,500 state-paid religious police, and the formation of an independent human rights organization. However, HRW said “Saudi officials did not indicate any plans to lift severe restrictions on the rights of women, guarantee religious freedom for Muslims and non-Muslims, or end punitive sanctions on perceived government critics, such as confiscation of passports and dismissal from jobs.”
The organization says that “to date, the pledged reforms have largely not materialized”, citing the example of a recent press crackdown on press freedom.
"Reforms on paper do not amount to much if the government's practices remain unchanged," HRW said.
HRW also expressed concern about the pace of legal reforms, including implementation of the kingdom's new criminal procedure code, which became law in May 2002. The code guarantees defendants the right to a lawyer during investigation and trial, and contains provisions to bring greater transparency to the criminal justice system. But HRW says, “It is unclear how the code is being implemented in practice. Of particular concern are thousands of men and women migrant workers who are currently imprisoned throughout the country, have little understanding of their rights in the justice system, and no effective access to legal assistance.”
The organization called on the Saudi government to “end harassment of journalists and writers, and guarantee freedom of expression; afford all residents of the kingdom the right to freedom of association without government control or interference; permit the establishment of independent women's rights organizations; allow domestic and international human rights monitoring of the criminal justice system, particularly cases of individuals who have been sentenced to death or are facing the death penalty or limb amputation; guarantee religious freedom to everyone in the kingdom, and remedy discrimination based on religious belief; afford greater protection to migrant workers by endorsing the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and implementing its provisions.”
When President Bush speaks of America ‘exporting democracy’ to the rest of the world, he surely cannot be thinking of Saudi Arabia. If he is, he is truly delusional. Because no one reading this page will live that long.
Here we have a website that even Howard Deaniacs would love – complete with candidates’ bios, interactive forums, online polls, message boards, and all the other paraphernalia needed to help voters participate in upcoming municipal elections. There’s only one catch: the site is for men only; women can’t vote or run for office.
Here we have an ophthalmologist named “Arab Woman of the Year” and the first woman pilot to be hired for the private fleet of a billionaire prince, and an innovative new stem cell technology that could potentially benefit millions of patients, thanks to a company founded by a woman doctor and her husband. But the ophthalmologist is forbidden from driving a car to the award ceremony, or the pilot to the airport – because women are barred from driving. And the stem cell research company is located in India.
Here we have a country where women are, however, not sleeping. They pushed hard for voting rights and candidacy – and lost. But at least one woman succeeded: She started an Internet magazine devoted to getting other women to participate in jihad.
Here we have a government promising reform, approving the first independent human rights organization in the country’s history, and organizing one of its own, and at the same time passing a law prohibiting public employees from talking to the news media, going on talk shows or making speeches criticizing government policies or programs.
Here we have a country whose government authorized the creation of a journalists’ association, and then fired a leading journalist who had been critical of the government.
Here we have a country that has imprisoned an American citizen for over a year without charge or access to legal counsel, reportedly at the request of the US, and which routinely rounds up human rights activists and ships them off to jail.
Here we have a country that gave us Osama Bin Laden and most of the 9/11 hijackers, a country whose billionaires have funneled millions to people who want to kill us, a country famous for its fanatical fundamentalist preachers, but now a country the United States hails as one of its staunchest allies in the ‘war on terror’.
No, this is not Neverland. It’s Saudi Arabia, a country caught between the dark ages and the twenty-first century. And ambivalent about which it likes best.
There is a one-word answer to ‘Why should we care?’ Oil. We have to care because without Saudi oil, the economies of the world would rapidly grind to a halt.
Many who claim to be Saudi ‘experts’ claim that ‘reform’ is happening in the Kingdom. They describe it as a ‘quiet revolution’. Perhaps. But the revolution is so quiet that none of the rest of us can hear a peep. And if there is change at all, its pace is beyond glacial.
A year ago, Saudi Arabia launched a new national advertising campaign in most of the top 25 U.S. media markets. Saudi officials said the ads were "designed to help broaden American perceptions of the country and demonstrate the Kingdom's steadfast commitment to fighting the War on Terrorism." The Saudi ambassador to the US was quoted as saying: "Despite all of the attention we have received, few people know what Saudi Arabia looks like or appreciate how far we have come in the last thirty years. Currently, there are big changes going on in Saudi Arabia. And we want Americans to know about them."
But Human Rights Watch (HRW), a leading advocacy group, said, “Without basic human rights reforms, Saudi Arabia's new media campaign in the United States will not change public opinion about the kingdom.”
The HRW statement declared, "Continuing restrictions on basic rights in Saudi Arabia are no secret. An expensive advertising and marketing blitz is no substitute for meaningful changes in how the government treats its citizens and its 5.5 million migrant workers.”
During a visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2003, senior Saudi government officials told an HRW delegation that reforms were on the way, including new procedures in the criminal justice system, restraints on 4,500 state-paid religious police, and the formation of an independent human rights organization. However, HRW said “Saudi officials did not indicate any plans to lift severe restrictions on the rights of women, guarantee religious freedom for Muslims and non-Muslims, or end punitive sanctions on perceived government critics, such as confiscation of passports and dismissal from jobs.”
The organization says that “to date, the pledged reforms have largely not materialized”, citing the example of a recent press crackdown on press freedom.
"Reforms on paper do not amount to much if the government's practices remain unchanged," HRW said.
HRW also expressed concern about the pace of legal reforms, including implementation of the kingdom's new criminal procedure code, which became law in May 2002. The code guarantees defendants the right to a lawyer during investigation and trial, and contains provisions to bring greater transparency to the criminal justice system. But HRW says, “It is unclear how the code is being implemented in practice. Of particular concern are thousands of men and women migrant workers who are currently imprisoned throughout the country, have little understanding of their rights in the justice system, and no effective access to legal assistance.”
The organization called on the Saudi government to “end harassment of journalists and writers, and guarantee freedom of expression; afford all residents of the kingdom the right to freedom of association without government control or interference; permit the establishment of independent women's rights organizations; allow domestic and international human rights monitoring of the criminal justice system, particularly cases of individuals who have been sentenced to death or are facing the death penalty or limb amputation; guarantee religious freedom to everyone in the kingdom, and remedy discrimination based on religious belief; afford greater protection to migrant workers by endorsing the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and implementing its provisions.”
When President Bush speaks of America ‘exporting democracy’ to the rest of the world, he surely cannot be thinking of Saudi Arabia. If he is, he is truly delusional. Because no one reading this page will live that long.
Tuesday, November 16, 2004
Four Times Falluja Equals?
Mark LeVine is professor of modern Middle Eastern history, culture, and Islamic studies at the University of California Irvine and author of the forthcoming books Why They Don't Hate Us: Lifting the Veil on the Axis of Evil and Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv and the Struggle for Palestine, 1880-1948, He is also the editor with Viggo Mortensen and Pilar Perez of Twilight of Empire: Responses to Occupation. He last spent time in Iraq in the early spring of this year.
By Mark LeVine
As American forces penetrate ever deeper and more destructively into the city of Falluja, each of the major players in this violent drama is engaged in a complex, constantly shifting calculus involving ways of turning events to their advantage. Of the many possible outcomes to the battle of Falluja, the four which seem most plausible follow, starting with the one that might be viewed most positively by the Bush administration. In sum, they offer us a grim picture of how the window of success has closed on American strategists in Iraq. Even the "best" outcomes below (from the administration's point of view) have lost the trappings of freedom and democracy that helped justify the invasion nineteen months ago.
The Hama Solution: In 1982, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad put down a potential nationwide revolt of religious activists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood by killing upwards of 20,000 people in the city of Hama, essentially flattening its central districts in the process. In an Iraqi version of the "Hama solution," the Americans and their Iraqi allies would take Falluja relatively quickly -- at whatever cost to its essential infrastructure -- in the process killing the majority of the resistance fighters in the city along with uncounted civilians who were too poor, young, old or infirm to flee before the invasion. Falluja would then act as a terrifying example to other rebellious Iraqi cities. The end, however temporary, of Mutaqa al-Sadr's Shia insurgency in the early fall increased the likelihood of success for such a move, freeing up as it did American troops from Najaf in the south and from the Shi'i slum of Sadr City in Baghdad. At the same time, the many month-long threat of a massive attack on Falluja seems to have created fracture lines in the resistance between indigenous groups seeking political solutions that might avoid mass civilian casualties and smaller groups of foreign jihadists, unbound by local ties and determined to fight to the death.
On the other hand, all those months of saber rattling evidently allowed many local fighters and jihadist leaders to leave the city before the invasion began, a troublesome development for American strategists and the interim government of Iyad Allawi as they seek to pacify the larger Sunni Triangle in time for announced elections in January. In the last week, after all, insurgents reoccupied the city center of Ramadi, attacked fiercely in Samarra, fought it out in Baghdad neighborhoods, and left authority in Mosul tottering, while American troops were occupied with the battle of Falluja -- and these were just a few of the many indications that, no matter what happens in Falluja, the insurgency is anything but defeated.
Yet if enough resistance fighters are killed to reclaim Falluja and sap the force of the insurgency in other cities, American strategists can at least hope to be on their way to a limited pacification of Sunni Iraq. Sunni leaders might next be bought off or co-opted and enough followers, fighters, and civilians, killed elsewhere to quiet the country for the next several months. Iraq would then have its "successful" election, and the Bush Administration would breathe a huge sigh of relief. So would Prime Minister Allawi who, according to a senior Iraqi official with whom I've spoken in recent days, is still livid that the Americans bypassed him to negotiate an end to the siege of Najaf. (According to my source, the bandaged hand Allawi sported during his recent trip to New York came from "banging his hands on the wall" after leaning of a secret meeting between American Ambassador John Negroponte and Shiite rebel leaders.) In one fashion or another, in this scenario, "democracy" would mean an extension of the Allawi government via a limited and managed election.
The ongoing, seemingly ceaseless violence in the Palestinian Occupied Territories under Israeli occupation reminds us that pacifying an occupied population is an endless job. But if, as the Bush administration now hopes, the insurgency can simply be tamped down, when it resurfaces next spring it will be the problem of an elected Iraqi government. American troops, in the meanwhile, would largely be withdrawn to a dozen or more major bases lowering American casualties; yet they could be called back into action any time violence threatened to get out of hand. Iraq would then take its place beside Colombia, Israel, and Sri Lanka, to name only a few of the many countries plagued by ongoing but "manageable" political violence -- while the United States would remain astride the second largest oil reserves in the world. This is today the best option available to the Bush administration.
The Jenin Scenario: If Falluja is largely subdued but low-level fighting continues for weeks or months in its back streets, chaos and anarchy might increase across the country, forcing a curtailment or postponement of the January elections, and yet the overall situation might not spin completely out of American control. The Allawi government would remain more or less in power in Baghdad and American troops could continue to occupy the country indefinitely (under the argument that the United States can't leave Iraq in the midst of chaos). The insurgency would be slowly exhausted over a longer period of time, laying the groundwork for a post-independence system favorable to American interests.
Here, the example of the 2002 Israeli siege of the Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin might prove the model for the present Falluja campaign. It stirred up incredible anger, violence, and chaos in Palestinian society and outrage internationally, but when the dust settled -- as it usually does --Israel's strategic position was actually stronger than before.
Even if the dust doesn't settle quite as advantageously in Iraq, or settle at all, Bush Administration hawks could turn the ensuing low-level chaos to their immediate advantage by allowing it, or encouraging it to spread to Syria (near whose border the U.S. recently staged a bloody invasion of the Iraqi town of Tal Afar) or Iran (already in the sights of senior Administration officials, regardless of any nuclear deal its leaders may sign with the Europeans). In fact, it is well known that Israeli operatives have been working with Kurds in both border regions to gauge the feasibility of such a scenario. In the meantime, according to Iraqi officials I've spoken with, American oil companies are quietly exploring the 90% of Iraq where oil deposits have yet to be tapped, free of potentially embarrassing scrutiny by a media focused on urban violence rather than desert oil. American casualties would also remain limited; media attention modest; and so a Jenin scenario would be seen, under the circumstances, as a quiet but significant victory by the Bush administration.
The "British" Solution (or 1920 Revisited): If the invasion of Falluja backfires -- if the fighting drags on and, for instance, there is evidence of large-scale civilian casualties, perhaps broadcast to the world by a dreaded al-Jazeera reporter via video phone -- Iraqi public opinion might be inflamed to the point of sparking a more general Sunni or yet more significantly Sunni-Shi'i revolt. This actually happened in 1920 when occupying British troops tried to use massive force to pacify the country and the results were devastating for the occupiers (as well as the occupied); or if the resistance in Falluja proves more resilient or better armed than American military officials assume it to be and is capable of dragging out the fighting until a desperate compromise solution along the lines of the deal to end the Najaf siege becomes inevitable, a revolt might also be encouraged; or if the insurgents, with months to plan, left only a minimal force in Falluja to fight a delaying action against the Americans and their Iraqi allies and are able to conduct a larger, sustained insurgency across Sunni (and parts of Shiite) Iraq, as seems increasingly likely, the result could be the same.
Any one of these developments or any combination of them would destroy what is left of the credibility of the Americans and of the Interim Iraqi Government. If not contained, the present insurgency, facing overwhelming and relatively indiscriminate American power, could spark a more general revolt, joined by significant number of Shi'ites (whose leaders, unlike during the first siege of Falluja in April, have so far remained relatively quiet). It would capitalize on the intense anger felt by a country that has seen as many as 100,000 of its citizens killed in the last eighteen months. With the political costs of retreat almost incalculable, the Bush administration in turn might ratchet up the violence (as it did in Vietnam) before considering real withdrawal strategies, hoping that the prospect of tens of thousands of further deaths in the next year would lead Iraqis to accept some continued American military presence in the country and, most important, a continued hand in the management of the country's petroleum resources.
The "French" Scenario: Any version of the "British" solution might, sooner or later, lead the Bush administration into the thickets of the even more unsettling "French" scenario. In this, a growing awareness of the human toll of the occupation, coupled with levels of political corruption that are already staggering would lend force to a desire to internationalize the next phase of Iraq's transition to full sovereignty. (A former top Allawi aide, who recently escaped the country, summed up Iraqi despair on the issue of corruption in lamenting to me that "the new regime is the same as Saddam's, just with different faces.") The "French" scenario might involve the intercession of France, Germany, and Spain, joined by UN Secretary General Kofi Anan and supported by a resurgent worldwide anti-war movement aroused by the ongoing horrors of Iraq. With the insurgency still under way, pressure would be applied for a cease-fire coupled with an internationalization of the transition to sovereignty based on the complete failure of the United States and the Allawi government to stabilize the country. French President Chirac's stated desire to build a counterweight to U.S. power and Kofi Anan's rising displeasure with U.S. actions could encourage such a development, as could the resignation of the Sunni members of the interim government and a full-scale Sunni boycott of any future American-organized elections. While the United States and the British would likely veto any Security Council resolution to mandate such a move, the groundswell of support for it could lead to major changes in the management of the occupation in the lead-up to elections.
If all four outcomes described above are striking for what they reveal about the narrowing of the Bush Administration's grand vision of a democratic and prosperous Iraq, the last one -- a kind of final humiliation -- would certainly be fiercely resisted by American officials and the Allawi government (nor would some factions of the insurgency be any too pleased by the possibility).
The wild card in the current crisis is the Iraqi people who, since the toppling of the Hussein regime, have more often than not remained horrified spectators while their country's political landscape has been reshaped. This passivity, though understandable given the Iraqi experience over the previous two decades, has proved as disastrous for them and their country as the passivity of Palestinians was during the crucial early years of the Oslo peace process (which in actuality allowed Israel to increase significantly its West Bank and Gaza settlements, while Yasir Arafat cemented his autocratic and corrupt rule virtually cost-free).
Ayatollah Ali Sistani's call for a massive nonviolent mobilization to end the siege of Najaf and the success of women's groups in preventing a rollback of their social rights, both demonstrate that the Iraqi people can become active shapers of their own destiny. Were the Shiites to pour into the streets nationwide, as they did in Najaf in response to Sistani, the Iraqi situation would immediately take on a different look and the American occupation might find its days quickly numbered. But can Iraqi society challenge the violent calculus of American military planners and insurgents alike with a vision of a future free of occupation and autocracy, corruption and extremism? More than wishing the Iraqis well, the international community needs to get its hands dirty to ensure that they have a fighting chance.
By Mark LeVine
As American forces penetrate ever deeper and more destructively into the city of Falluja, each of the major players in this violent drama is engaged in a complex, constantly shifting calculus involving ways of turning events to their advantage. Of the many possible outcomes to the battle of Falluja, the four which seem most plausible follow, starting with the one that might be viewed most positively by the Bush administration. In sum, they offer us a grim picture of how the window of success has closed on American strategists in Iraq. Even the "best" outcomes below (from the administration's point of view) have lost the trappings of freedom and democracy that helped justify the invasion nineteen months ago.
The Hama Solution: In 1982, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad put down a potential nationwide revolt of religious activists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood by killing upwards of 20,000 people in the city of Hama, essentially flattening its central districts in the process. In an Iraqi version of the "Hama solution," the Americans and their Iraqi allies would take Falluja relatively quickly -- at whatever cost to its essential infrastructure -- in the process killing the majority of the resistance fighters in the city along with uncounted civilians who were too poor, young, old or infirm to flee before the invasion. Falluja would then act as a terrifying example to other rebellious Iraqi cities. The end, however temporary, of Mutaqa al-Sadr's Shia insurgency in the early fall increased the likelihood of success for such a move, freeing up as it did American troops from Najaf in the south and from the Shi'i slum of Sadr City in Baghdad. At the same time, the many month-long threat of a massive attack on Falluja seems to have created fracture lines in the resistance between indigenous groups seeking political solutions that might avoid mass civilian casualties and smaller groups of foreign jihadists, unbound by local ties and determined to fight to the death.
On the other hand, all those months of saber rattling evidently allowed many local fighters and jihadist leaders to leave the city before the invasion began, a troublesome development for American strategists and the interim government of Iyad Allawi as they seek to pacify the larger Sunni Triangle in time for announced elections in January. In the last week, after all, insurgents reoccupied the city center of Ramadi, attacked fiercely in Samarra, fought it out in Baghdad neighborhoods, and left authority in Mosul tottering, while American troops were occupied with the battle of Falluja -- and these were just a few of the many indications that, no matter what happens in Falluja, the insurgency is anything but defeated.
Yet if enough resistance fighters are killed to reclaim Falluja and sap the force of the insurgency in other cities, American strategists can at least hope to be on their way to a limited pacification of Sunni Iraq. Sunni leaders might next be bought off or co-opted and enough followers, fighters, and civilians, killed elsewhere to quiet the country for the next several months. Iraq would then have its "successful" election, and the Bush Administration would breathe a huge sigh of relief. So would Prime Minister Allawi who, according to a senior Iraqi official with whom I've spoken in recent days, is still livid that the Americans bypassed him to negotiate an end to the siege of Najaf. (According to my source, the bandaged hand Allawi sported during his recent trip to New York came from "banging his hands on the wall" after leaning of a secret meeting between American Ambassador John Negroponte and Shiite rebel leaders.) In one fashion or another, in this scenario, "democracy" would mean an extension of the Allawi government via a limited and managed election.
The ongoing, seemingly ceaseless violence in the Palestinian Occupied Territories under Israeli occupation reminds us that pacifying an occupied population is an endless job. But if, as the Bush administration now hopes, the insurgency can simply be tamped down, when it resurfaces next spring it will be the problem of an elected Iraqi government. American troops, in the meanwhile, would largely be withdrawn to a dozen or more major bases lowering American casualties; yet they could be called back into action any time violence threatened to get out of hand. Iraq would then take its place beside Colombia, Israel, and Sri Lanka, to name only a few of the many countries plagued by ongoing but "manageable" political violence -- while the United States would remain astride the second largest oil reserves in the world. This is today the best option available to the Bush administration.
The Jenin Scenario: If Falluja is largely subdued but low-level fighting continues for weeks or months in its back streets, chaos and anarchy might increase across the country, forcing a curtailment or postponement of the January elections, and yet the overall situation might not spin completely out of American control. The Allawi government would remain more or less in power in Baghdad and American troops could continue to occupy the country indefinitely (under the argument that the United States can't leave Iraq in the midst of chaos). The insurgency would be slowly exhausted over a longer period of time, laying the groundwork for a post-independence system favorable to American interests.
Here, the example of the 2002 Israeli siege of the Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin might prove the model for the present Falluja campaign. It stirred up incredible anger, violence, and chaos in Palestinian society and outrage internationally, but when the dust settled -- as it usually does --Israel's strategic position was actually stronger than before.
Even if the dust doesn't settle quite as advantageously in Iraq, or settle at all, Bush Administration hawks could turn the ensuing low-level chaos to their immediate advantage by allowing it, or encouraging it to spread to Syria (near whose border the U.S. recently staged a bloody invasion of the Iraqi town of Tal Afar) or Iran (already in the sights of senior Administration officials, regardless of any nuclear deal its leaders may sign with the Europeans). In fact, it is well known that Israeli operatives have been working with Kurds in both border regions to gauge the feasibility of such a scenario. In the meantime, according to Iraqi officials I've spoken with, American oil companies are quietly exploring the 90% of Iraq where oil deposits have yet to be tapped, free of potentially embarrassing scrutiny by a media focused on urban violence rather than desert oil. American casualties would also remain limited; media attention modest; and so a Jenin scenario would be seen, under the circumstances, as a quiet but significant victory by the Bush administration.
The "British" Solution (or 1920 Revisited): If the invasion of Falluja backfires -- if the fighting drags on and, for instance, there is evidence of large-scale civilian casualties, perhaps broadcast to the world by a dreaded al-Jazeera reporter via video phone -- Iraqi public opinion might be inflamed to the point of sparking a more general Sunni or yet more significantly Sunni-Shi'i revolt. This actually happened in 1920 when occupying British troops tried to use massive force to pacify the country and the results were devastating for the occupiers (as well as the occupied); or if the resistance in Falluja proves more resilient or better armed than American military officials assume it to be and is capable of dragging out the fighting until a desperate compromise solution along the lines of the deal to end the Najaf siege becomes inevitable, a revolt might also be encouraged; or if the insurgents, with months to plan, left only a minimal force in Falluja to fight a delaying action against the Americans and their Iraqi allies and are able to conduct a larger, sustained insurgency across Sunni (and parts of Shiite) Iraq, as seems increasingly likely, the result could be the same.
Any one of these developments or any combination of them would destroy what is left of the credibility of the Americans and of the Interim Iraqi Government. If not contained, the present insurgency, facing overwhelming and relatively indiscriminate American power, could spark a more general revolt, joined by significant number of Shi'ites (whose leaders, unlike during the first siege of Falluja in April, have so far remained relatively quiet). It would capitalize on the intense anger felt by a country that has seen as many as 100,000 of its citizens killed in the last eighteen months. With the political costs of retreat almost incalculable, the Bush administration in turn might ratchet up the violence (as it did in Vietnam) before considering real withdrawal strategies, hoping that the prospect of tens of thousands of further deaths in the next year would lead Iraqis to accept some continued American military presence in the country and, most important, a continued hand in the management of the country's petroleum resources.
The "French" Scenario: Any version of the "British" solution might, sooner or later, lead the Bush administration into the thickets of the even more unsettling "French" scenario. In this, a growing awareness of the human toll of the occupation, coupled with levels of political corruption that are already staggering would lend force to a desire to internationalize the next phase of Iraq's transition to full sovereignty. (A former top Allawi aide, who recently escaped the country, summed up Iraqi despair on the issue of corruption in lamenting to me that "the new regime is the same as Saddam's, just with different faces.") The "French" scenario might involve the intercession of France, Germany, and Spain, joined by UN Secretary General Kofi Anan and supported by a resurgent worldwide anti-war movement aroused by the ongoing horrors of Iraq. With the insurgency still under way, pressure would be applied for a cease-fire coupled with an internationalization of the transition to sovereignty based on the complete failure of the United States and the Allawi government to stabilize the country. French President Chirac's stated desire to build a counterweight to U.S. power and Kofi Anan's rising displeasure with U.S. actions could encourage such a development, as could the resignation of the Sunni members of the interim government and a full-scale Sunni boycott of any future American-organized elections. While the United States and the British would likely veto any Security Council resolution to mandate such a move, the groundswell of support for it could lead to major changes in the management of the occupation in the lead-up to elections.
If all four outcomes described above are striking for what they reveal about the narrowing of the Bush Administration's grand vision of a democratic and prosperous Iraq, the last one -- a kind of final humiliation -- would certainly be fiercely resisted by American officials and the Allawi government (nor would some factions of the insurgency be any too pleased by the possibility).
The wild card in the current crisis is the Iraqi people who, since the toppling of the Hussein regime, have more often than not remained horrified spectators while their country's political landscape has been reshaped. This passivity, though understandable given the Iraqi experience over the previous two decades, has proved as disastrous for them and their country as the passivity of Palestinians was during the crucial early years of the Oslo peace process (which in actuality allowed Israel to increase significantly its West Bank and Gaza settlements, while Yasir Arafat cemented his autocratic and corrupt rule virtually cost-free).
Ayatollah Ali Sistani's call for a massive nonviolent mobilization to end the siege of Najaf and the success of women's groups in preventing a rollback of their social rights, both demonstrate that the Iraqi people can become active shapers of their own destiny. Were the Shiites to pour into the streets nationwide, as they did in Najaf in response to Sistani, the Iraqi situation would immediately take on a different look and the American occupation might find its days quickly numbered. But can Iraqi society challenge the violent calculus of American military planners and insurgents alike with a vision of a future free of occupation and autocracy, corruption and extremism? More than wishing the Iraqis well, the international community needs to get its hands dirty to ensure that they have a fighting chance.
Sunday, November 14, 2004
ARAB INTERNET: INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY OR TRIP TO JAIL?
By William Fisher
Internet use in the Arab Middle East is growing rapidly, but there is evidence that many countries in the region are increasing their crackdowns on what they consider to be dissident content.
A study of 11 countries carried out by the Cairo-based Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (HRINFO) – “The Internet In the Arab World: A New Space of Repression? “ – finds many of the area’s estimated 14 million Internet users facing shutdown of websites and Internet cafes, and prosecution for a variety of crimes.
The study charges that "Arab governments typically use the protection of Islamic values and public morals to justify banning websites of human rights or political opposition groups that censure these governments; even forums are banned in Arab countries." Gamal Eid, HRINFO's executive director and the writer of the study, adds: "Most of these governments oppose freedom of expression in particular, and other political and civil freedoms in general."
The study reveals that while some states arrest Internet users just for surfing websites of the oppositional parties or groups, other countries use the Internet to trap socially rejected segments in violation of regulatory and legal requirements.
The study charges that Arab governments use not only traditional methods of curtailing freedom of expression -- censorship and confiscation – but have also developed technologies such as electronic filtering programs to control access to ‘trouble’ sources.
According to Najla Al Rostamani, head of the Gulf News Research Centre, “The building of a networked society is policy-driven…The policy followed in the Arab world goes against the very concept on which the Internet is based. The Internet thrives on freedom to exchange and debate and not on censorship. So long as the barriers to information accessibility remain in place, the Arab world will never become part of the information revolution.”
The HRINFO study finds the most active censorship in Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. These countries use a variety of tools, including criminal prosecutions, to stop Internet use by opposition political groups, homosexuals, Islamic fundamentalists and religious minorities. In most of these countries, Internet Cafes have been shut down, websites blocked, and numerous users sentenced to prison for ‘improper’ Internet use.
More enlightened, according to the study, are Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, and post-Saddam Iraq.
In Egypt, improper Internet use is being used to justify prosecution of individuals from several opposition political groups, Islamists, journalists, homosexuals, and political activists. Moreover, Egypt has organized a new police unit, known as the "Internet Police".
Prosecutions have included twelve leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, a suspect charged with using the Internet to send false information to "foreign bodies" (meaning foreign human rights organizations) about human rights violations in Egypt, an Egyptian journalist who created a website containing articles critical of Egyptian syndicates, and another user convicted of "disseminating abroad false news that could harm the state's national interests."
In Tunisia, the government bans opposition websites as well as several international websites, including such well-known sites as "Hotmail", and many Palestinian, Egyptian, and human rights websites.
In 2002, a Tunisian court sentenced a journalist, founder and editor-in-chief of the news website, “TUNeZINE”, to two years and four months in prison for "disseminating false news" and "fraudulent use of a means of communication."
According to HRINFO, at least 40 other Tunisians have been “sentenced to long prison terms and tortured, just for logging on to some websites claimed by authorities to be terrorist websites."
The situation in Syria is equally discouraging. The government bans numerous websites and e-mail service providers, and has arrested and convicted many who have attempted to bypass these bans to criticize the government. Syria bans websites with pornographic content and those it considers "hostile” -- pro-Israel, Islamic, web pages with articles about Syrian news and issues, and Kurdish-language news websites based in Germany which provided news, pictures and video clips of demonstrations by the Syrian Kurdish minority. The HRINFO study estimates that, in addition to pornographic web pages, there are 137 blocked websites.
Dozens of Syrians are detained every month for "defamation", or for “disseminating false news abroad” -- criticizing the Syrian government. HRINFO reports they are referred to military courts or detained without trial for periods ranging from three months to three years, or arrested and detained in police stations, where they are more vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment.
In Saudi Arabia, the study finds, 400,000 web pages were banned and filtered to “protect Islamic values and culture” in 2004. The Saudi government has blocked several Shi'a and Islamic websites that offer interpretations differing from the official Wahhabi line, banned international websites like Yahoo, American Online, and the well-known Arab Tawy Forum, and has even banned medical websites that use words like "chest" or "breasts", even though these words are used in explicitly medical contexts.
In Bahrain, the government justifies Internet bans on grounds that the government is the defender of morality and by claiming that certain websites are responsible for creating “domestic turmoil”, the study reports. However, it also bans the websites of political opposition groups.
By mid-2003, the number of Internet users in Libya was estimated to be 850,000, and is rapidly reaching a million. The Libyan Government has invested heavily in the IT sector. But the growth of Internet service has also provided Libyan dissidents scattered around the world with the opportunity to contact Libyan citizens and to strengthen their networks in the country. Most opposition, human rights, forums, news, and even literary websites are based abroad, and the Libyan government attempts to block these sites.
In Yemen, there are some 150,000 Internet users. Both the Yemeni Ministry of Communications and the Yemeni Ministry of Culture have banned and monitored many websites, and these actions have led to a decline in Internet usage. The Yemeni government justifies the banning and blocking for the preservation of "morality." The ban extends to political and cultural websites.
Until the end of 2002, Internet use in Iraq was limited to those who could afford it. In 2002, the number of Internet users among Iraq's total population of 24 million people was only 45,000, and many of these were state officials. Former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein justified his prohibition of Internet use by claiming the Internet as an "American propaganda tool."
The study says “it is too early to state that the occupation has brought about the freedom of Internet use and the absence of censorship.” It adds: “Though Iraq's state of disorder has opened up a space of freedom, it has also produced serious fears. Living conditions continue to deteriorate. Owners of Internet centers close their stores at night out of fear-fear of both the occupying forces and those of the resistance.”
However, Iraq today has a thriving ‘blogging’ community, with hundreds of sites hosted by Iraqis and US and other Coalition soldiers.
The study finds Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates among the more promising states in the Arab cyber world.
Jordanians were quick to seize the medium’s new opportunities for expression. Users included leftists, Islamists, human rights groups deprived of freedom of expression for political reasons, Shiites and Christians deprived on religious grounds, and homosexuals, deprived for both social and religious reasons. There are many Cyber Cafes, and the admission age has recently been reduced from 16 to 13. In general, there is little censorship, though the country is considering a new law to regulate audio and visual broadcasting.
In the United Arab Emirates, the report estimates the number of Internet users to be 1.25 million, or 31% of the population. This places the UAE among the most advanced nations in Internet use not only among Arab states but internationally as well. In its assessment of national e-government programs, the United Nations ranked the Emirates number one among Arab states and 21st in the world.
But censorship is nonetheless the subject of considerable debate. Some say the “Proxy Filtering System” has contributed to the growth of the net because it allows people access from inside their homes upon condition that there be some sort of censorship to protect their families from ‘morally offensive’ websites. Others have called for absolute freedom and cancellation of the Proxy Filtering System.
Compared with most Arab states, the study finds, Qataris enjoy more Internet freedom of Internet use and less censorship. There has been no news of website bans other than those placed on some pornographic websites.
Internet use in the Arab Middle East is growing rapidly, but there is evidence that many countries in the region are increasing their crackdowns on what they consider to be dissident content.
A study of 11 countries carried out by the Cairo-based Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (HRINFO) – “The Internet In the Arab World: A New Space of Repression? “ – finds many of the area’s estimated 14 million Internet users facing shutdown of websites and Internet cafes, and prosecution for a variety of crimes.
The study charges that "Arab governments typically use the protection of Islamic values and public morals to justify banning websites of human rights or political opposition groups that censure these governments; even forums are banned in Arab countries." Gamal Eid, HRINFO's executive director and the writer of the study, adds: "Most of these governments oppose freedom of expression in particular, and other political and civil freedoms in general."
The study reveals that while some states arrest Internet users just for surfing websites of the oppositional parties or groups, other countries use the Internet to trap socially rejected segments in violation of regulatory and legal requirements.
The study charges that Arab governments use not only traditional methods of curtailing freedom of expression -- censorship and confiscation – but have also developed technologies such as electronic filtering programs to control access to ‘trouble’ sources.
According to Najla Al Rostamani, head of the Gulf News Research Centre, “The building of a networked society is policy-driven…The policy followed in the Arab world goes against the very concept on which the Internet is based. The Internet thrives on freedom to exchange and debate and not on censorship. So long as the barriers to information accessibility remain in place, the Arab world will never become part of the information revolution.”
The HRINFO study finds the most active censorship in Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. These countries use a variety of tools, including criminal prosecutions, to stop Internet use by opposition political groups, homosexuals, Islamic fundamentalists and religious minorities. In most of these countries, Internet Cafes have been shut down, websites blocked, and numerous users sentenced to prison for ‘improper’ Internet use.
More enlightened, according to the study, are Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, and post-Saddam Iraq.
In Egypt, improper Internet use is being used to justify prosecution of individuals from several opposition political groups, Islamists, journalists, homosexuals, and political activists. Moreover, Egypt has organized a new police unit, known as the "Internet Police".
Prosecutions have included twelve leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, a suspect charged with using the Internet to send false information to "foreign bodies" (meaning foreign human rights organizations) about human rights violations in Egypt, an Egyptian journalist who created a website containing articles critical of Egyptian syndicates, and another user convicted of "disseminating abroad false news that could harm the state's national interests."
In Tunisia, the government bans opposition websites as well as several international websites, including such well-known sites as "Hotmail", and many Palestinian, Egyptian, and human rights websites.
In 2002, a Tunisian court sentenced a journalist, founder and editor-in-chief of the news website, “TUNeZINE”, to two years and four months in prison for "disseminating false news" and "fraudulent use of a means of communication."
According to HRINFO, at least 40 other Tunisians have been “sentenced to long prison terms and tortured, just for logging on to some websites claimed by authorities to be terrorist websites."
The situation in Syria is equally discouraging. The government bans numerous websites and e-mail service providers, and has arrested and convicted many who have attempted to bypass these bans to criticize the government. Syria bans websites with pornographic content and those it considers "hostile” -- pro-Israel, Islamic, web pages with articles about Syrian news and issues, and Kurdish-language news websites based in Germany which provided news, pictures and video clips of demonstrations by the Syrian Kurdish minority. The HRINFO study estimates that, in addition to pornographic web pages, there are 137 blocked websites.
Dozens of Syrians are detained every month for "defamation", or for “disseminating false news abroad” -- criticizing the Syrian government. HRINFO reports they are referred to military courts or detained without trial for periods ranging from three months to three years, or arrested and detained in police stations, where they are more vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment.
In Saudi Arabia, the study finds, 400,000 web pages were banned and filtered to “protect Islamic values and culture” in 2004. The Saudi government has blocked several Shi'a and Islamic websites that offer interpretations differing from the official Wahhabi line, banned international websites like Yahoo, American Online, and the well-known Arab Tawy Forum, and has even banned medical websites that use words like "chest" or "breasts", even though these words are used in explicitly medical contexts.
In Bahrain, the government justifies Internet bans on grounds that the government is the defender of morality and by claiming that certain websites are responsible for creating “domestic turmoil”, the study reports. However, it also bans the websites of political opposition groups.
By mid-2003, the number of Internet users in Libya was estimated to be 850,000, and is rapidly reaching a million. The Libyan Government has invested heavily in the IT sector. But the growth of Internet service has also provided Libyan dissidents scattered around the world with the opportunity to contact Libyan citizens and to strengthen their networks in the country. Most opposition, human rights, forums, news, and even literary websites are based abroad, and the Libyan government attempts to block these sites.
In Yemen, there are some 150,000 Internet users. Both the Yemeni Ministry of Communications and the Yemeni Ministry of Culture have banned and monitored many websites, and these actions have led to a decline in Internet usage. The Yemeni government justifies the banning and blocking for the preservation of "morality." The ban extends to political and cultural websites.
Until the end of 2002, Internet use in Iraq was limited to those who could afford it. In 2002, the number of Internet users among Iraq's total population of 24 million people was only 45,000, and many of these were state officials. Former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein justified his prohibition of Internet use by claiming the Internet as an "American propaganda tool."
The study says “it is too early to state that the occupation has brought about the freedom of Internet use and the absence of censorship.” It adds: “Though Iraq's state of disorder has opened up a space of freedom, it has also produced serious fears. Living conditions continue to deteriorate. Owners of Internet centers close their stores at night out of fear-fear of both the occupying forces and those of the resistance.”
However, Iraq today has a thriving ‘blogging’ community, with hundreds of sites hosted by Iraqis and US and other Coalition soldiers.
The study finds Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates among the more promising states in the Arab cyber world.
Jordanians were quick to seize the medium’s new opportunities for expression. Users included leftists, Islamists, human rights groups deprived of freedom of expression for political reasons, Shiites and Christians deprived on religious grounds, and homosexuals, deprived for both social and religious reasons. There are many Cyber Cafes, and the admission age has recently been reduced from 16 to 13. In general, there is little censorship, though the country is considering a new law to regulate audio and visual broadcasting.
In the United Arab Emirates, the report estimates the number of Internet users to be 1.25 million, or 31% of the population. This places the UAE among the most advanced nations in Internet use not only among Arab states but internationally as well. In its assessment of national e-government programs, the United Nations ranked the Emirates number one among Arab states and 21st in the world.
But censorship is nonetheless the subject of considerable debate. Some say the “Proxy Filtering System” has contributed to the growth of the net because it allows people access from inside their homes upon condition that there be some sort of censorship to protect their families from ‘morally offensive’ websites. Others have called for absolute freedom and cancellation of the Proxy Filtering System.
Compared with most Arab states, the study finds, Qataris enjoy more Internet freedom of Internet use and less censorship. There has been no news of website bans other than those placed on some pornographic websites.
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